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THOSE INDISPENSABLE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION-STAGE IN
CONSTITUTIONALISM, PASSAGE FOR THE
FRAMERS, AND CLUE TO THE NATURE OF
THE CONSTITUTION*
Arthur R. Landever**
INTRODUCTION
"It was the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the
brain and purpose of man."' Was that spoken about the Articles of Confed-
eration?2 Of course not! It was said of our wondrous Constitution, that doc-
ument penned in 1787 and glorified in song and story. The speaker was
William Gladstone,3 the English Prime Minister during the American
centennial celebration. As for the Articles, they are the Rodney Dangerfield
of constitutions, getting no respect, with bulging eyes, and hands tugging
nervously at a necktie. The Articles, our country's first constitution, have
been relegated to oblivion.4 Yet our Constitution surely did not arise with-
* This article grew out of research for a lecture presented on March 11, 1987 at Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law. See Articles of Confederation: Gateway to the Constitution, 58 CLEV. B. J.
14041 (1987).
The author wishes to thank his colleague, Professor Joel Finer, and Carolyn M. Landever for
their helpful suggestions and also to thank the members of the Arizona Law Review for their fine
editorial assistance.
** Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. B.A.,
J.D., Ph.D., New York University.
1. 1 G. GROB & G. BILLIAS, INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY-PATTERNS AND
PERSPECTIVES 204 (2d ed. 1972).
2. See Articles of Confederation, in 1 P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION
23-26 (1987); M. JENSEN, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, infra note 26, at 263-70; DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, infra note 115, at 111-16.
3. Contrast Gladstone's view with that of his countryman, Walter Bagehot, who credited the
moderation of America's people for the constitutional system's success. W. BAGEHOT, THE ENG-
LISH CONSTITUTION 224-25, 228 (1968) (first published in 1867). See also infra notes 314-19 and
accompanying text.
4. In the leading hornbook on constitutional law, for example, there are apparently only two
references to the Articles in 1720 pages and one of these was in a footnote. Admittedly, the work
does not purport to be one in history. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-4, at
32-33 n.7, § 6-3, at 404 (2d ed. 1988). See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 82 (11th ed.
1985); but see, for a fuller historical treatment, G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, & M.
TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2-5, 115, 133 (1986) (citing Johnson, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
At times, the Supreme Court cites the Articles, and contrasts the lack of authority under them
with power under the present constitution. See, eg., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Public
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out antecedents, as if created by demigods from Mount Olympus. It drew
upon roots of constitutionalism. A key fertile period of constitutional dis-
covery and experimentation was that swath of time between 1774 and 1787.
That was when the American Continental Congress held sway,5 acting either
in anticipation of the ratification of the Articles, or under their authority.
Part of the rich brew of Revolutionary constitution-making, the Arti-
cles were a significant stage in the march of constitutionalism. 6 They were
invaluable, indeed, indispensable, to the drafters at the Philadelphia Conven-
tion as a transitional experience, and as a model to reflect upon. What is
more, they still offer insights into our founders' perceptions about constitu-
tions, and thus enrich our understanding about the complex nature of consti-
tutional interpretation.
The author considers the Articles, first on the world's stage as a
landmark. He next treats the Articles as a means of readying the Framers
for constitution-making in 1787. The Articles would be a crucible, training
ground, and failed model to draw upon. He then discusses the pragmatic
and complex legal culture which produced the Articles, and ultimately, our
open-textured Constitution.
The Traditional View of the Articles-Courting Political
and Economic Disaster
One can choose, if one wishes, to peer "through a glass, darkly."' 7 Tra-
ditionally, that is what we Americans have done, if we have considered the
Articles, and the work of the Continental Congress, at all. Not that the case
against the Articles is difficult to make: Drafted in final form in 1777, rati-
fied in 1781, and in effect until the new Constitution was implemented in
1789, they created a mere "league of friendship."8 "Sovereignty" was ex-
pressly retained by the thirteen constituent states.9 The instrument provided
for no independent presidency, and it had no separate federal judiciary to
enforce the decisions of the hapless Continental Congress. European
capitals laughed at the spectacle of American diplomats who could not as-
sure state cooperation. John Adams was asked: "Do you represent one
country or thirteen?" 10 Lord Sheffield declared that Britain could name her
Transp. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987); South Cent. Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). But see
Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (noting similar privilege and immunities
clauses).
5. Actually, the Congress was the national government until the new Constitution was imple-
mented in 1789.
6. This age-old quest for the forms, procedures, and institutional arrangements most suit-
able for limiting power and implementing a community's conception of political right and
justice, we know as CONSTITUTIONALISM.
Constitutionalism takes as its purpose resolution of the conflict that characterizes
political life and makes government necessary, through procedures and institutions that
seek to limit government and create spheres of individual and community freedom.
Belz, Constitutionalism and the American Founding, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CON-
sTrrUTION 480, 481 (L. Levy ed. 1986); see also Casper, Constitutionalism, id. at 473.
7. "For now we see [in a mirror] darkly." I Corinthians 13:12 (King James).
8. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. III.
9. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II. But see infra note 321 (dispute regarding nature
and locus).
10. H. GRAFF, AMERICA-THE GLORIOUS REPUBLIC 157 (1985).
[Vol. 31
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own terms because "America cannot retaliate."'"
Foreign governments not only mocked; they took actions based on
those attitudes. Thus, after the war, the British continued to occupy forts in
the old Northwest, claiming as justification the failure of the United States
both to compensate loyalists for confiscated land and to repay pre-war debts.
The Spanish, controlling New Orleans, effectively blocked navigation of the
Mississippi River, a vital passage for expanded commerce and settlement in
the lands west of the Appalachians. The Barbary pirates continued to seize
American sailors in the Mediterranean. And confusion abounded. In one
instance, a Swedish diplomat mistakenly presented his credentials to the
governor of Massachusetts-considering the state a separate and independ-
ent sovereignty-much to the chagrin and consternation of Congress's Sec-
retary of Foreign Affairs, John Jay.12
The weakness and misunderstanding stemmed, in large part, from the
fact that the Congress was denied the authority to tax. Instead, the legisla-
tive body was forced to rely on requisitions imposed upon the states, 13 and
unfortunately, only about one-sixth of the requisitions were ever paid.14 Su-
perintendent of Finance Robert Morris described himself as a "man who is
to direct the finances of a country almost without revenue."'15 By March,
1781, public credit had almost vanished.1 6 Government securities were
worth only a fraction of their face value.17 The creditor most feared by the
Continental Congress was the Continental Army itself. Indeed, in 1783, the
Congress fled Philadelphia in fear of a mutiny, or more, by unpaid troops.1 8
There was no money to pay interest on loans-let alone money to repay the
principal-or to garrison troops in the West to protect settlers from the
Indians.
Moreover, Congress lacked the authority to regulate commerce among
the states, and trade wars resulted. Some states were particularly vulnerable.
New Jersey, squeezed between the ports of New York and Philadelphia, was
likened to a "cask tapped on both ends,"' 9 forced as it was to pay duties on
products obtained from its neighboring states. North Carolina, between
South Carolina and Virginia, found itself in the same predicament, a "pa-
tient, bleeding at both arms."' 20
By the mid-1780s the situation grew even worse. The Continental Con-
gress was veering toward bankruptcy. Yet it still could not persuade all thir-
teen states-unanimity being needed to pass an amendment2 -to agree to
11. Id. Jefferson, then Ambassador to France, said: "All respect for our government is annihi-
lated on this side of the water from an idea of its want of energy." D. UNGER, THESE UNITED
STATES-QUESTIONS OF OUR PAST 134 (3d ed. 1986).
12. Olson, Soderstrom Incident-A Reflection upon Federal State Relations Under the Articles
of Confederation, 55 N.Y. HISr. Soc. Q. 109-18 (1971).
13. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VIII, cl. 1.
14. A. WEINSTEIN & R. WILSON, FREEDOM & CRiSIS-AN AMERICAN HISTORY 183 (1978).
15. A. MCLAUGHLIN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 139 (1963).
16. Harmon, Proposed Amendments to the Articles of Confederation, 24 S. ATLANTIC Q. 411,
413 (1925).
17. D. UNGER, supra note 11, at 133.
18. Id.
19. Harmon, supra note 16, at 425.
20. Id.
21. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII.
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provide it with meaningful revenue authority. The quality of the Congres-
sional membership continued to decline.22 In addition, the body found it
increasingly difficult even to muster a quorum, and its power began to dis-
integrate.23 Most ominous, by 1786, armed bands of farmers, in desperate
financial straits and led by former Continental Army officer Daniel Shays,
closed the courts in the Massachusetts interior and threatened to lay siege to
Boston.24 To George Washington, there was impending ruin.25
A Bum Rap?
But was the situation that bad? After all, we had just defeated the
vaunted British. And as for our financial predicament in the 1780s, histori-
ans Merrill Jensen 26 and E. James Ferguson27 do not view it as a desperate
one. They stress that, for supporters of the Articles, the key to financial
stability lay with the sale of the western territory. The land was a vast, rich,
virgin domain of the United States; it was a treasure that could retire the
national debt. Indeed, according to Jensen,28 the national government came
to realize forty-four million dollars from the sale of land parcels by the 1830s;
such a result justified anti-federalist claims that the problem of the debt was
exaggerated.
Rather than state resistance, the picture was one of state willingness to
absorb the central government's debt. The states feared, not without cause,
that the Continental Congress might use the excuse of the debt to enhance
Congress's revenue powers. 29 Therefore, by the end of the war, the states
accepted a substantial part of the federal debt.
Congress might have required the states to absorb even more and in a
22. Black, Articles of Confederation, in GENESIS & BIRTH OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
245, 256 (J. Chandler ed. 1924); see infra note 109.
23. G. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-87, at 359 (1969); see infra notes
108, 235.
24. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 103 (5th ed. 1976).
25. "Thirteen sovereignties pulling against each other and all tugging at the federal head will
soon bring ruin on the whole." J. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE NEW NATION
(1783-1793), at 101 (1969).
26. M. JENSEN, NEW NATION-HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDER-
ATION 1781-89 (1965) [hereinafter NEW NATION]; M. JENSEN, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
1774-1781 (1970).
27. Ferguson, State Assumption of the Federal Debt During the Confederation, 38 MIss. VAL-
LEY HIST. REv. 403 (1951).
28. M. JENSEN, NEW NATION, supra note 26, at 359.
29. Ferguson, supra note 27, at 404; see also J. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL
POLrTcs: INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 339 (1979).
Most of the states made earnest efforts to pay federal debts as well as their own. In the
closing years of the war they redeemed the remnants of Continental currency, took over a
substantial part of the federal certificate debt, and became responsible for sums which Con-
gress owed to the Continental Army for pay and depreciation. Later, at the bidding of the
federal creditors, they began to assume the debts which supported Congress's bid for in-
creased power....
Had these methods been pursued to the end and Congress's resources in western lands
brought into play, the federal public debt would no doubt have been retired sooner and at
less cost.... Most important, however, the public debt would have been stripped of its
political functions. It would not have vitalized the movement for national government nor
become the pivot of the Hamiltonian [funding] system.
Ferguson, supra note 27, at 424.
[Vol. 31
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few years the debt would have ceased to exist. 30 However, the delegates to
the Congress were of two minds. True, the members wanted the central
government's finances put on a sound footing. And this meant, in part, that
Congress had to find a way to reduce the debt or deal with it. In that regard,
the Northwest Ordinance of 1785 gave each state a quota of western lands to
be sold locally, with the funds used to pay war debts.31 But leading con-
solidationists-men like Robert Morris, Alexander Hamilton, and James
Madison-saw the federal debt from another perspective as well. To them it
was a national blessing, a "powerful cement to the union."
32
In any event, the nation's financial situation was not as bleak as typi-
cally painted. Jensen contends that "the Confederation [should not be seen
as] a government staggering along without an income," for it was succeeding
at "deficit financing,"'33 an approach to government operation not entirely
unlike our present modus operandi. Moreover, in the 1780s, most of the
states appeared relatively stable and prosperous, even experiencing economic
growth.34 To historian Charles Beard, the period 1781-88 was not so eco-
nomically critical as traditionally has been charged.
35
But whatever the economic difficulty, the country remained generally
peaceful and stable; Shays' Rebellion, for example, was put down with little
difficulty.3 6 Nor could the Articles be blamed, in the main, for the economic
woes that did beset the country. After all, the Revolutionary War had
nearly destroyed the New England fisheries and had led to agricultural de-
cay in the South.37 Moreover, the country now lay outside the protective
British mercantile system.
Matters Of Perspective, Definitions, and Cause and Effect
Ferguson suggests that Federal Debt historians for too long approached
the problem of the new nation's financial situation from the perspective of
the consolidationists in the Continental Congress. 38 Perspective, of course,
can both focus and distort one's view of reality. So much depends upon the
kinds of questions asked, the evidence drawn upon, the labels employed, and
the criteria used to evaluate what one finds.
And of course one may find, not coincidentally, what one is looking for.
Historians may seek out underlying consensus 39 or conflict.40 Some may
30. Ferguson, supra note 27, at 404.
31. Id. at 420.
32. Id. at 412.
33. M. JENSEN, NEW NATION, supra note 26, at 386, 388.
34. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 394.
35. "[Uln many respects [there was] steadily recovering order and prosperity. [And] economic
conditions of the country seemed to be improving ... [O]nly one group had suffered ... those who
held wartime securities." Quoted in D. UNGER, supra note 11, at 128.
36. Id. at 142.
37. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 24, at 103.
38. Ferguson, supra note 27.
39. See, eg., B. WRIGHT, CONSENSUS & CONTINUITY 1776-87 (1958).
40. M. JENSEN, NEW NATION, supra note 26; M. JENSEN, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION,
supra note 26; C. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States
(1935).
1989]
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concentrate upon ideas as a major force in history,41 while others focus upon
institutions or actors.42 Still others may lay stress on demographics. 43
And what period of time does one choose? Is the period 1775-89 an
important and coherent one?44 Indeed, is it to be considered a "critical"
period in our history, with "unselfish patriots rescuing the nation from im-
pending anarchy"? 45 In examining that period, should one focus upon what
had come before, in other words, the "legacy," 46 or emphasize what seemed
to be "emerging"? 47 Perhaps one needs to have a dual concern, understand-
ing that a particular time in history is an "integral part of the past in which
it was rooted and of the future into which it was growing."'4
Influencing the historian's point of view is the vantage point of his own
time period. The noted philosopher-historian Benedetto Croce well said that
"[e]very true history is contemporary history." 49 Every generation seeks to
"[reinterpret] the past in terms of its own age."50 To what extent have
scholars, looking back, identified their time with that of the struggles of the
1770s and 1780s? It should be no surprise that historians, writing immedi-
ately after our wrenching Civil War, believed in strong central government;
therefore, they readily accepted the Hamiltonian-Federalist portrait of a
dark Confederation period.51
Yet with state efforts in the early 1900s to seek their own "progressive"
reforms came new historical analyses. These painted a different picture; his-
torians praised Jefferson's emphasis on local government, saw the Confeder-
ation period more benignly, and cast a suspicious eye upon the motives of
the Framers.52
Just as our endeavor can be clouded by our generation's perspective, it
can be muddled by the definitions we choose. For example, what do we
mean by the "Articles of Confederation"? The draft offered by John Dickin-
son in 1776, the one considered the most consolidationist?5 3 The draft as
41. See, eg., B. BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1967) [herein-
after B. BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS]; G. WOOD, supra note 23.
42. Some historians have almost deified the actors. See, e.g., G. GROB & G. BILLIAS, supra
note 1, at 203. The Americans "were more sensitively religious, better educated, of serener minds
and purer souls than the men of any former republic." G. BANCROFT, 2 HISTORY OF THE FORMA-
TION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 366-67 (1882).
43. See B. BAILYN, VOYAGERS TO THE WEST-A PASSAGE IN THE PEOPLING OF AMERICA
ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION (1986).
44. See, eg., G. WOOD, supra note 23; M. JENSEN, NEW NATION, supra note 26; M. JENSEN,
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 26; B. WRIGHT, supra note 39.
45. See M. JENSEN, NEW NATION, supra note 26, at xiii (rejecting the "critical period" view
made famous by John Fiske in CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1893)); M. JENSEN,
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 26, at 244.
46. See, e.g., L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY (1960).
47. See, e.g., L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985).
48. M. JENSEN, NEW NATION, supra note 26, at vii. For differing perspectives, see ESSAYS ON
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (L. Levy ed. 1969).
49. G. GROB & G. BILLIAS, supra note 1, at 1.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 245-46, 202-203; J. FISKE, supra note 45; G. BANCROFT, supra note 42; M. JENSEN,
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 26, at 3.
52. See G. GROB & G. BILLIAS, supra note 1, at 249; C. BEARD, supra note 40.
53. See M. JENSEN, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 26, at 175 (Draft of John Dick-
inson, dated July 12, 1776). But see Note, United States and the Articles of Confederation: Drifting
Toward Anarchy or Inching Toward Commonwealth?, 88 YALE L.J. 142 (1978).
[Vol. 31
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amended in the Continental Congress? 54 The final one offered the states?55
The Articles, as brought to life by the actions and institutions of the Conti-
nental Congress-anticipating the Articles' ratification and thereafter?
Beyond definitions, how should we evaluate the Articles? In terms of
the successes and failures of the central government acting under its aus-
pices? Clearly that approach has been taken by those who evaluate our 1787
Constitution. Moreover, are the Articles to be considered a key independent
variable, explaining how we arrived at "Union"? Are they to be viewed,
instead, as a product of that union, achieved under the leadership of General
Washington, 56 or that of the Continental Congress itself? And were we win-
ning the war and maintaining the peace because of or despite the Articles?
Could it be that our enemies, the British and the hostile Indian tribes, were
more responsible for our unity than were the Articles?
These same hard questions, of course, might be posed as to our revered
Constitution of 1787. To wit: Has the Constitution really been responsible
for our liberties? Or should credit go to the two great oceans separating us
from Europe and Asia? To the internal squabbles in those lands across the
seas that kept distant nations otherwise occupied? To our vast resources?
To the availability of a frontier to which the poor, the angry, and those with
a wanderlust could seek a new life? To the waves of new immigrants? To
our legal heritage? To our politics? 57
Given these difficulties, what are the author's premises? First, the Arti-
cles are a coherent and presumably important subject, as the national instru-
ment of government preceding the Constitution. Second, the Articles are
best understood as encompassing the acts and institutions under their au-
thority, or in clear anticipation of their ratification.5" Third, assessment of
social phenomena is admittedly complex; and there is arbitrariness, of
course, in singling out the Articles, because they can hardly be evaluated
apart from the political actors and institutions of the time.
A SIGNIFICANT STAGE IN CONSTITUTIONALISM
With such premises in mind, let us turn to the place of the Articles in
history's recorded efforts to frame mechanisms for limiting government
power. Indeed, the Articles of 1781 were a landmark, richly deserving a
place alongside the Magna Carta of 1215, and the United States Constitution
of 1787. They constituted the world's first national written charter
54. See Note, supra note 53, at 142.
55. See Articles of Confederation, supra note 2. In 1781, after having been ratified by Maryland,
the last state to approve, the Articles formally came into effect.
56. "Before there was a nation-before there was any symbol of that nation . . . there was
Washington .. " Even afterward, "he was still there, steadying the symbols, lending strength to
them instead of drawing it from them." G. WILLS, CINCINNATUS-GEORGE WASHINGTON AND
THE ENLIGHTENMENT xxi (1984). See also R. BERNSTEIN, ARE WE TO BE A NATION? THE MAK-
ING OF THE CONSTITUTION 124 (1987).
57. W. BAGEHOT, supra note 3, at 224-25, 228.
58. It makes sense to use this definition. The Articles "transformed the Continental Congress
from a de facto to a de jure government. Thus the Confederation deserves credit for the accomplish-
ments of the Continental Congress occurring before the formal ratification." R. BERNSTEIN, supra
note 56, at 28. We shall also take account of the legal culture of the period, which served as an
important backdrop.
1989]
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grounded upon fundamental principles of republicanism and federalism.
Uniquely, the Articles drew upon and combined several distinct elements:
classical notions of republicanism, the Hebrew-Puritan idea of a covenant
relationship with God, constitutional notions of the English natural rights
school, a history of government under written charters, the idea of a consti-
tution as a limiting document, and the practical necessity of confederation
for the Americans' safety and well-being.59 Moreover, the Articles served
the vital task of making our Revolutionary government legitimate. Under
them, our national Congress enacted an historic Bill of Rights for the west-
ern territory. 60
The republic under the Articles was a significant advance over the ear-
lier ones, as the Americans well knew.6 1 The republics during the classical
age of Athens and Rome, like the confederation under the Articles, were
grounded on the idea of government by representatives of the people for the
common good.6 2 The earlier political systems, however, were not limited by
a fixed written constitution; in contrast, the Americans of the 1770s and
1780s were the People of the Charter. They had a tradition of resting gov-
ernment power upon written instruments, the writings seen as different from
ordinary legislation.6 3 The custom arose from religious notions of a solemn
agreement of a people with God and with each other, as well as from British
practices in establishing colonies through varied written mechanisms.64
True, the short-lived unitary Cromwellian state of seventeenth century Eng-
land had a written constitution, but the Institutes of Government were less
an effort to regulate and limit government power than they were an attempt
by the military to increase its influence.65
59. Federal democracy is the authentic American contribution to democratic thought and
republican government. Its conception represents a synthesis of the Puritan idea of the
covenant relationship as the foundation of all proper human society and the constitutional
ideas of the English natural rights school .... Contractual noncentralization-the struc-
tured dispersion of power among centers whose legitimate authority is constitutionally
guaranteed-is the key to the widespread and entrenched diffusion of power that remains
the principal characteristic of and argument for federal democracy.
Elazar, Federalism (Theory), in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 6,
at 704, 705. See also Young, Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, 63 A.B.A. J. 1572, 1575
(1977); Belz, supra note 6, at 480, 482; G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 51; Corwin, Progress of Constitu-
tional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Conven-
tion in CONSTITUTION (J. Smith ed, 1971); infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text; infra notes 146-
49 and accompanying text.
60. See infra note 118.
61. See infra note 68. Jefferson, notwithstanding his concerns, supra note 10 and accompany-
ing text, described the Confederation system as the "[blest existing or that ever did exist." M. FAR-
RAND, FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (1913). Americans had a
"compulsive interest" in the ancient republics. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 50.
62. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 52. The Articles in terms, expressly committed the states "in
Congress united," to ensure the common defense and general welfare of the member states. ARTI-
CLES OF CONFEDERATION art. III.
63. "The formation of government was to a considerable extent based on written instruments."
Belz, supra note 6, at 482.
64. Elazar, supra note 59; A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 24, at 7-26 (joint stock
company charters, religious compacts, royal grants).
65. A. WOOLRYCH, COMMONWEALTH TO PROTECTORATE 352 (1982). R. PAUL, LORD PRO-
TECTOR-RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE LIFE OF OLIVER CROMWELL 322 (1955). Cromwell
wanted to be thought of as a "constable" seeking to keep the peace and uphold the law of the land,
rather than as a despot. A. WOOLRYCH, supra, at 365. However well meaning, he became a " 'dicta-
[Vol. 31
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Admittedly, in the Articles' republicanism, the central government
would be chosen by the state legislatures instead of by the people directly.
Those legislatures, however, were being selected by the broadest suffrage in
the western world.6 6 Furthermore, monarchy was rejected, as were titles of
nobility.67 No religious orthodoxy was present in the Articles, either. In-
deed, the established church would soon be gone in all the states but Massa-
chusetts and Connecticut.
The republican government, under the Articles, was a confederate one,
yet it placed key powers in a national congress and sought to impose sub-
stantial restrictions on the states. The fact is that the Articles achieved a
remarkable degree of cohesion, for the Confederation that came about was
the strongest in history.68
No such unity had been present under history's earlier confederations-
the Greek and Roman city states, the Swiss cantons, the Italian cities during
the Renaissance. 69 For one thing, here Congress was granted substantial
authority: it could make war and peace,70 enter treaties, 7 1 send and receive
ambassadors, 72 raise armies through requisition,73 coin,74 and borrow.75 In
addition, the states were obliged, at least theoretically, to honor the provi-
sions of the Articles.76 Moreover, the states were pledged to afford out-of-
state citizens the "privileges and immunities" of in-staters.77 Similarly,
states were to give another state's judicial proceedings and records "full faith
and credit."7 8 Finally, under the Articles a fugitive from justice (often a
euphemism for a runaway slave) could be the subject of extradition.79
Besides these links of union, the American Confederation witnessed an-
other advance. At times the central government did not seek implementa-
tion merely through the state governments. Rather, it acted upon
tor', but it was not from choice." R. PAUL, supra, at 391. Yet Cromwell supported "liberty of
conscience" to a greater degree than in Puritan New England about the same time. Id. at 356.
66. DePauw, Land of the Unfre" Legal Limitations on Liberty in Pre-Revolutionary America,
68 MD. HIST. MAG. 355, 366 (1973). Granted, of course, that upwards of 85% of the people-
women, slaves, Indians, non-propertied and young apprenticed-were not eligible to vote, or to "en-
joy the ... rights of freemen." Id. at 356.
67. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, cl. 1.
68. "[W]hat is truly remarkable about the Confederation is the degree of union that was
achieved." G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 359. The Articles created "the strongest confederation in
history." Young, supra note 59, at 1575.
69. Young, supra note 59; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 18-20 (J. Madison); C. FRIEDRICH, TRENDS
OF FEDERALISM-THEORY AND PRACTICE 14 (1968); W. RIKER, FEDERALISM (1964); S. MOGI,
PROBLEMS OF FEDERALISM-A STUDY OF POLITICAL THEORY (1931); Scheiber, Federalism (His-
tory), in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 697.
70. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 1.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION arts. VIII, IX, cls. 5, 6.
74. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cls. 5, 6, 7.
75. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cls. 6, 7.
76. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII. Indeed, even Thomas Burke, who led the suc-
cessful move to water down the Articles by substituting an express "sovereignty" reserve in the
states (see ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II), nonetheless recognized that state laws in conflict
with congressional resolves were void. R. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNIoN-1781-1789, at
90 (1987). Burke did so "more than three years before the Articles went into effect." Id.
77. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, cl. 1.
78. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, cl. 3.
79. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, cl. 2.
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individuals directly in a number of situations.80
The Articles: Law, Enforceable in the Courts
Significantly, a rudimentary federal court system81 (dependent upon the
Congress), as well as some state court practices,82 helped enforce the Arti-
cles. That development distinguished American constitutionalism from con-
stitutionalism elsewhere. "[V]iewing a constitution as a species of 'law' was
the vital link between constitutionalism and judicial competence to decide
constitutional issues."'83 Thus, as early as 1776, first, committees of Con-
gress, and then, a special Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, heard cases
dealing with the rights of American privateers who had captured British
property.84 Over one hundred cases were heard, about forty percent appar-
ently resulting in reversals of state court judgments.85 Most of the state
courts seemed to have honored the reversals. 86 In addition, the Articles au-
thorized an arbitration process to resolve disputes between states, or between
private persons as to matters respecting state land transactions.87 In fact,
though several cases were considered, some informally, only one case,88 in-
volving a dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, went to judgment.
As for cases involving piracy, the Articles authorized jurisdiction in the
Continental Congress, which in turn assigned such cases to the state
courts.
8 9
80. These included matters concerning judicial "cases of capture, piracy. ... the post-office,...
coins, weights and measures ... trade with the Indians. ... claims under grants of land by different
States, and... in the case of trials by courts-martial." THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 262 (J. Madison)
(J. Cooke ed. 1961).
81. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cls. 1, 2.
82. See Note, supra note 53, at 148.
83. Gunther, Judicial Review, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra
note 6, at 1056; G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 291: "What in the final analysis gave meaning to the
Americans' conception of a Constitution was not its fundamentality or its.., creation by the people,
but rather its implementation in the ordinary courts of law; the theory that the Articles of Confeder-
ation were for some purposes law, directly cognizable by courts, entirely transformed the character
of the Confederation... and must sooner or later have suggested the idea of its entire transformation
into a real government . . . ." Corwin, supra note 59, at 112. See also infra notes 146-49 and
accompanying text.
84. The special committees were created at the urging of General Washington. See ARTICLES
OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 1; Jameson, The Predecessor of the Supreme Court, in ESSAYS IN
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD 1775-1789,
at 7 (Jameson ed., 1889); H. BOURGUIGNON, FIRST FEDERAL COURT-FEDERAL APPELLATE
PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1775-1787 (1977); Davis, Federal Courts Prior to
the Adoption of the Constitution, in 131 U.S. xix (Appendix 1889); R. MORRIS, supra note 76, at 67-
68 (In most cases, execution was routine, even though 49 cases out of 104 over an 11 year period
resulted in "out-right reversals" of state court judgments. Id. at 68. Some states did seek to narrow
congressional appellate jurisdiction, however.).
85. R. MORRIS, supra note 76, at 68; see also infra note 86.
86. About 118 cases were heard. Jameson, supra note 84, at 36; Note, supra note 53, at 158-59;
H. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 84, at 236, 275. As the spirit of 1776 waned, state resistance in-
creased. See Jameson, supra note 84, at 11; but see Davis, supra note 84, at xxix (state courts refused
to enforce the rights of persons owning property acquired under Federal decrees).
87. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cls. 2, 3.
88. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 24, at 97.
89. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 1; Jameson, supra note 84, at 3.
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Legitimizing the Revolutionary Government
The Articles recognized a "perpetual" union,90 and authorized the Con-:
tinental Congress to exercise broad powers. 91 In doing so, they legitimized
the ad hoe American government.92 The Americans who had asserted rights
under English common law and who now sought assistance from other na-
tions deemed crucial a government authorized by law. Furthermore, the
Articles "performed two [related] services of great moment: they kept the
idea of union vital during the period when the feeling of national unity was
at its lowest ebb and they awarded formal recognition that the great powers
of war and foreign relations were intrinsically national in character." 93
At about the same time that the Continental Congress proclaimed
America's independence, the national legislature started work on the draft of
a charter of confederation. The action was in response to Richard Henry
Lee's motion on June 7, 1776 for a "Plan of confederation [to] be prepared
and transmitted to the respective Colonies for their consideration and appro-
bation."' 94 Thus, one can view the Articles as a full partner of the Declara-
tion of Independence, both founding documents of American governance.
Indeed, efforts at confederation started even earlier than 1776. The previous
year, Benjamin Franklin had urged his colleagues to establish a confedera-
tion,95 recalling his 1754 Albany Plan for a broad national union.96 That
1754 proposal, in turn, had drawn upon the-confederacy of the six Iroquois
Indian "nations." '97
"Union" was important to the Americans of the 1770s and 1780s.98 To
90. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION preamble, "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual
Union;" and art. XIII.
91. See supra notes 70-75.
92. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 24, at 95; the state constitutions would do the same
for the actions taken by the local congresses and committees. W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS, REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN
THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 21 (1980).
93. Corwin, supra note 59, at 107-08.
94. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, at 24. The Congress approved the Articles in 1777 but the
requisite thirteenth state did not ratify them until 1781. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying
text.
95. See Levy, Constitutional History 1776-89, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION, supra note 6, at 376, 377.
96. M. JENSEN, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 26, at 108.
97. It would be a very strange thing if Six Nations of Ignorant Savages should be capable
of forming a scheme for such a Union and be able to execute it in such a manner as that it
has subsisted for Ages, and appears indissoluble, and yet a like Union should be impracti-
cable for ten or a dozen English colonies. Benjamin Franklin to James Parker, 1751.
quoted in B. JOHANSEN, FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE IROQUOIS AND THE
RATIONALE FOR THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 56 (1982).
98. The idea of American Union can be traced as far back as 1698, when William Penn called
for an appointee of the British sovereign to preside over regular meetings of deputies by the colonies.
The plan envisioned a congress to settle trade disputes and to resolve disagreements concerning
fugitive slaves and debtors. The legislative body would deal with the Indian tribes as well. The plan
even contemplated the setting of quotas of men and money. M. JENSEN, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERA-
TION, supra note 26, at 107.
James Wilson describes the heady days early in the war, when there was a great grass roots
movement toward a strong national union:
[But by the] spring of 1777, the nationalist momentum was spent. By then most of the
states had adopted constitutions and had legitimate governments. Previously, provincial
governments of local 'congresses,' 'conventions,' and committees had controlled the states
and looked to the Continental Congress for leadership and approval. But the creation of
1989]
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Virginia, fighting a war and in need of help from other states, it was impor-
tant enough to cede-claims to vast stretches of bitterly disputed virgin West-
ern lands.99 Moreover, the key role of the Continental Congress was also
recognized. The provisional committees in Massachusetts willingly appealed
to that body for guidance in setting up a new state government.100 None of
the thirteen colonies, for that matter, adopted a state constitution "without
an explicit previous recommendation from" the Congress.10 1 In addition,
other officials of the Continental government helped make the idea of union
a meaningful one.10 2 These officers included federal judges, federal ambassa-
dors, federal land agents dealing with Indian tribes, managers of the western
territory, and Continental Army officers.
The Limits of American Confederate Power
However much the Articles represented an advance in the concept of a
Confederate Union, one cannot deny an overriding fact of the time: the Con-
gress essentially played an advisory role and was at the mercy of the states
for general implementation.10 3 Major resolutions required the approval of
nine states.104 In addition, there was no basic enforcement machinery either
against individuals or the "sovereign" states.
Yet, one historian suggests that the very weakness of the central govern-
ment reflected the democratic philosophy of the eighteenth century.10 5 Such
a philosophy presupposed that no Continental government could be superior
legitimate state governments reinvigorated old provincial loyalties .... [According to Wil-
son,] '[a]mong the first sentiments expressed in the first Congs. one was that Virga. is no
more. That Massts. is no more, that Pa. is no more &c. We are now one nation of breth-
ren. We must bury all local interests and distinctions....' The turning point occurred in
late April 1777 when... Burke [successfully argued against] the report of the Committee
of the Whole [and amended the Articles, substituting Article II which expressly placed
sovereignty in the states]."
Levy, supra note 95, at 378-79. By then only 17 of 48 congressmen who had been members of the
Committee of the Whole that adopted the Dickinson draft-which had sought to limit state powers
to those over "internal police"-remained in Congress. Id.
Despite the 1777 setback, the tendency toward union remained. See infra text accompanying
note 107; Note, supra note 53. In 1781 and 1783, 12 states out of 13 supported a revenue measure
that would have strengthened the Congress's hand. See R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, at 90. Efforts
to engage in broad construction of the Congress's powers continued and the consolidationists re-
grouped by the mid-1780s and led a successful movement, through conventions, to establish a strong
national government.
99. Young, supra note 59, at 1574; M. JENSEN, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 26,
at 150; Jensen, Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 Miss. VALLEY HiST. REv. 27, 43 (1936).
100. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 131.
101. W. ADAMS, supra note 92, at 49.
102. Note, supra note 53, at 164; THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 262 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed.
1961). In addition, "[s]tate judges regularly gave 'full credence... to judgments of the courts in any
of the United States.'" Note, supra note 53, at 159.
103. "Congress simply could not make anyone, except soldiers, do anything. It acted on the
states, not on the people." Levy, supra note 95, at 379. Of course, that the Americans won the war
evidences much state cooperation during the war period. Moreover, the states were willing to as-
sume a good part of the war debt. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. And state judges
typically gave credence to the judgments of the Federal Court of Appeal in case of capture. See
supra note 102; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text for the proposition that the central
government did act upon individuals, at times.
104. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 6.
105. M. JENSEN, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 26, at xv.
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to the local legislature of the people.106 That writer argues that consolida-
tionists later waged an "anti-democratic" crusade to gain a central govern-
ment with powers equal to those held earlier by the British king and
Parliament. 107
Unquestionably, Americans seeking to enlarge national power strove to
gain an independent source of revenue'0 8 and effective sanctions' 0 9 for the
Congress. They were resisted by "state sovereignty" forces" 0 which had
gained legitimacy"' following passage of republican state constitutions.
Ironically, it was the Congress, upon the urging of provincial committees,
that recommended the enactment of such charters." 2 In any event, by 1777,
these state forces took the battle to the Congress, successfully diluting the
Dickinson draft 13 of the Articles. Consolidationists slowly regrouped and
by the mid-1780s were intensifying efforts to strengthen the "ever-present
tendency toward union." 114
A NOTABLE CONGRESSIONAL LANDMARK: THE
NORTHWEST ORDINANCES
1 15
Despite its political struggles, the Continental Congress achieved nota-
ble success in holding the nation together during the war and into the 1780s.
And even though attendance declined 16 and the quality of the membership
admittedly suffered 17 during this time, the Congress was still able to pass
the remarkable Northwest Ordinances in the 1780s.
The Ordinances were among the most important laws ever passed by an
American national legislature and they say much about republicanism in this
period. In large part they dealt with the acquisition, distribution, orderly
settlement, and administration of the western territory beyond the Appa-
lachian Mountains to the Mississippi River. Significantly, the Ordinance of
1787118 included a "Bill of Rights"' 1 9 for the vast territory, which in a few
106. Id. at xviii.
107. Id. at 150.
108. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, at 91.
109. Levy, supra note 95, at 380.
110. Id. at 378-79.
111. J. RAKOVE, supra note 29, at 81-82; Levy, supra note 95, at 378.
112. R. MORRIS, supra note 76, at 58.
113. Levy, supra note 95, at 378-79; supra note 53. Contrast Dickinson's draft of Article III
("Each Colony shall retain and enjoy as much of present Laws, Rights and Customs, as it may think
fit, and reserves to itself, the role and exclusive Regulation and Government of its internalpolice, in
all matters that shall not interfere with the Articles of Confederation," in M. JENSEN, ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION, supra note 26, at 254 (emphasis added)) with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art.
II.
114. W. ADAMS, supra note 92, at 290; see also infra note 211.
115. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY (H. Commager 8th ed. 1968) Doc. No. 75,
Resolution of Congress on Public Lands OcL 10, 1780, at 119-20 (lands ceded by the states were to be
formed into "republican" states); Doc. No. 77, Report of the Government for the Western Territory
April 23, 1784, at 121-23 (Jefferson's plan for the organization of government in the western
territory, never put into effect); Doc. No. 78, Land Ordinance of 1785, May 20, 1785, at 123 (lays
foundation for public land system, reserving certain lands for public education); Doec. No. 82, The
Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787, at 128 (basically follows Jefferson's plan). See infra note 118.
116. R. MoRaS, supra note 76, at 92.
117. Id. at 94.
118. Northwest Ordinance of1787in P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, supra note 2, at 27-29 [herein-
after Northwest Ordinance].
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years would become the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Iowa,
and Wisconsin. (The territory included part of present-day Minnesota as
well).
That Bill of Rights expresses powerfully the sentiments of the Congress.
Most importantly, slavery was forever outlawed. 120 There were other funda-
mental guarantees as well: trial by jury,121 protection of the writ of habeas
corpus, 122 judgment in accordance with the law of the land (that is, due
process), 123 the right to bail except in capital cases, 124 the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, 125 the right to just compensation
should private property be taken by government, 126 free public education, 127
and religious freedom. 128 Interestingly, the Ordinance of 1787 could also be
viewed as America's first women's rights act because it guaranteed that
daughters could inherit property equally with sons.129
In addition to a declaration of rights for individuals, the Ordinance
made clear that the territory itself would not be subordinate to the original
thirteen states. There would be no colonies in America. New states to be
carved out of the territory were to enter the Union on an "equal footing with
the original States."1 30 As settlers moved into the territory, they were also
to treat the Indians fairly. In particular, Indian lands were not to be taken
against their will.13'
THE IDEOLOGICAL HERITAGE
Beyond the importance of the Articles as the authorizing instrument for
the landmark Ordinances, they proved invaluable to the Framers of the Con-
stitution. The Articles and the resulting Confederation government served
as a vital passage for the Framers. Of course, the drafters of the Constitu-
tion shared with their earlier counterparts an ideological heritage-drawn
from classical thinkers, Enlightenment philosophers, and English lawyers
and members of Parliament.
Suspicion of British Motives
That legacy also included a deep suspicion of English political practices
in the eighteenth century. 132 As early as the 1760s, the colonists perceived
that the British were attempting to take away American liberties. Britisher
Edmund Burke said: "Americans had made a discovery, or thought they
119. Id.
120. Id. at art. VI (although a fugitive slave entering the territory still could be reclaimed).
121. Id. at § 14, art. II.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at art. III.
128. Id. at art. I.
129. Id. at § 2.
130. Id. at art. V.
131. Indians were to be treated with the "utmost good faith. [Tiheir lands and property shall
never be taken from them without their consent." Id. at art. III.
132. B. BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 41, at viii-ix, 158.
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have made one, that we mean to oppress them." 133 Even Shays' Rebellion in
1786 was attributed, at least in part, to British subversion.
134
To some extent, the explanation for this deep distrust, perhaps even
paranoia, lies in the fact that the Americans were creatures of their seven-
teenth century beginnings. The Puritan heritage of New England was one
particularly born of hatred of kingly assertions of divine right. The colonists
in the 1760s remembered the previous century as a time when the people, the
Parliament, and the common law courts were united against assertions of
Stuart absolutism. Indeed, from the colonial vantage point in the 1760s,
there could be no retreat from the constitutional balance achieved by the
English Glorious Revolution of 1688.135
Early in the eighteenth century, American Whig political tracts began
to perceive efforts to reassert kingly tyranny, but this time, indirectly,
through devious manipulation.136 Later, especially during the time between
the Declaration of Independence and 1787, a radical and romantic idealiza-
tion of the seventeenth century-and its worship of the Magna Carta-took
place. 137
To the colonists in the 1760s, the English Parliament was no longer a
protector of the people's liberty. The Americans now rejected Blackstone's
position that "[w]hat Parliament doth, no power on earth can undo."'138 By
1774, they disputed any Parliamentary jurisdiction over America. The colo-
nists argued that they were not properly represented in that body.139 In
part, their attitude stemmed from their view of representation. While the
British had moved to the idea of "virtual representation," in which the legis-
lator could choose to act against the wishes of his constituents, America was
moving in the opposite direction.14°
Furthermore, it was clear to the colonists by the 1770s that royal tyr-
anny, however more subtle and corrupting, confronted them. To John Ad-
ams, it was apparent that the British "have [thrown] off the mask." 141 These
suspicions puzzled the Tories. To them, never in history had there been so
much rebellion grounded upon so "little real cause." 142 But the Americans,
having been left pretty much to their own devices for five generations
1 43
were demonstrating a "fierce spirit of liberty."' 44 They were self-confident,
133. Id. at 158.
134. See F. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION xiv (1973).
135. W. ADAMS, supra note 92, at 18.
136. B. BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 41, at 48; G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 12.
137. B. BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 41, at vi; Belz, supra note 6, at 480, 482.
138. Quoted in Levy, supra note 95, at 355.
139. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 177, 352.
140. B. BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 41, at 164.
141. Id. at 118.
142. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 3.
143. "The second outstanding fact in early American constitutional history was substantial com-
munity control over local affairs." Belz, supra note 6, at 482.
144. Burke: "[Y]our colonies become suspicious, restive, and untractable whenever they see the
least attempt to wrest from them by force, or shuffle from them by chicane [their liberties] .... This
fierce spirit of liberty is stronger in the English colonies probably than in any other people of the
earth." Black, supra note 22, at 245; Belz, supra note 6, at 482. Burke said the colonists' extensive
study of law and politics had made them acutely sensitive about their liberties. G. WOOD, supra
note 23, at 4-5.
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having met the measure of the French in the Seven Years War, and discov-
ered at the same time that the vaunted British soldiers were not their betters.
Indeed, the Americans, with their seventeenth century religious roots, con-
sidered themselves God's chosen. They were new humans, breathing the
purer air of the new world, and they thought themselves "living at the begin-
ning of history." 145
The Transformation of Ideas About Governance
In this period of the Revolutionary War and the Confederation, as
Americans engaged in factional politics locally and nationally, ideas about
the nature of the government were in ferment. Already by the 1770s the
colonists began to conceptualize a freer, republican confederacy. In doing
so, they owed a debt to classical notions of virtue in the polis, to the ancient
charters of Englishmen, to Montesquieu's reflections on separation of pow-
ers, and to Lockean ideas of equality and the rights of people to change a
despotic government.
A Constitution
In particular, Americans looked at the idea of a "constitution" from a
modern perspective. It was now a "supreme law creating government [and]
limiting it.' ' 146 The notion was a radical departure from the British concep-
tion of a constitution as merely a nation's system of government-its funda-
mental legislation, institutions, and custom. Indeed, in a sense, "the
triumph in America of a novel concept of 'constitution' was the 'revolu-
tion.'"147 Thus, for Americans, unconstitutionality went beyond British
ideas of inexpediency or mere lack of wisdom of legislation. Unconstitu-
tional government action was void.148 Imprecisely grasped in 1776, the
American idea was fixed by 1787.149
Religious Freedom
Views about religious freedom evolved during the Confederation period
as well. Alongside established churches, Jefferson could speak as a deist in
referring to a non-interfering "Nature's God."150 By the 1780s, the Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 1776,151 the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,152 and
the Constitution of 1787153 reflected the new religious tolerance in America.
145. G. WooD, supra note 23, at vii; D. BooRsTIN, LosT WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 238
(1948).
146. Levy, Constitution, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 6,
at 355-57. Views of the nature of a Constitution have changed. Id. See Casper, Constitutionalism, 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 474, 475; see generally C. MCILWAIN, CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM-ANCIENT AND MODERN (1947).
147. Levy, supra note 146, at 355; Casper, supra note 146, at 474.
148. Levy, supra note 146, at 356.
149. Id. at 355.
150. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
151. Virginia Declaration of Rights June 12, 1776, in P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, supra note 2,
at 6.
152. See supra note 118.
153. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 provides that "No religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."
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Three Basic Issues of Constitutionalism
In the crucible of war and crisis, as debate raged over the Articles, new
ideas were in the air.15 4 Notions were changing as to three central questions:
Who were "We the People?" Whom did we have to fear more-a central
government or the state legislatures? How could we best frame a structure
of government to provide stability and liberty?
"The People"
In 1776, "The People" meant a homogeneous interest, a community
collectively challenging the exercise of unjust power by the king and Parlia-
ment.155 By 1787, however, the term connoted individuals with heterogene-
ous inclinations. Thus, government had to control and diffuse their power to
assure that no one faction of self-interested persons would dominate the
political landscape.' 56 Moreover, in the Revolutionary period, a "conven-
tion" of the people was seen as an extra-legal legislative body. 157 That ex-
plains why the Articles were ratified by ordinary state legislatures. By 1787,
however, state conventions, called for the specific purpose of considering the
Framers' work in Philadelphia, were now deemed the ultimate expression of
"The People."' 58
"Republicanism"
Basic ideas about republicanism also evolved during this period. "Re-
publicanism" generally connoted government by representatives of the peo-
ple for the common good. Increasingly, though, rejection of an established
church' 59 and support for public education 160 became part of its definition.
But how could such a government maintain itself? Traditionally, it was
thought that a republican government could only survive in a small geo-
graphic area.' 61 Too large a territory would bring the return of despotic
154. Levy, Constitution Convention, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION,
supra note 6, at 358-59 ("[A] new sett [sic] of ideas seemed to have crept in," said Oliver Ellsworth,
speaking with reference to the fact that back in 1781 "[c]onventions of the people.., were not then
thought of.") But for the proposition that the vital change from 1776-87 was not in "ideas or atti-
tudes but in the balance of political power." See M. JENSEN, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra
note 26, at 245.
155. G. WooD, supra note 23, at 16 ("single unitary estate").
156. Id. at 607. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56, 61 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
157. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 318.
158. Id. See Morgan, Constitutional History before 1776 in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 367, 375 (There was "need... [to find] a way to relieve popular
government from the grip of short-sighted representative assemblies. [The Constitutional Conven-
tion] filled the need."); Palmer, The People as Constituent Power, in CONSTrrUTION 76-77, supra note
59 ("The most distinctive work of the Revolution was in finding a method and furnishing a model
for putting [the idea of popular sovereignty] into practical effect .... The Americans solved the
problem [of constituting new government] by the device of the constitutional convention .... "); W.
ADAMS, supra note 92, at 139 (The institutionalizing of the right to change a constitution was one
step further than the Glorious Revolution of 1688).
159. The established church would soon be gone in all states but Massachusetts and Connecti-
cut. F. McDONALD & E. McDONALD, CONFEDERATION & CONSTITUTION 1781-1789, at 5 (1968).
The Virginia Bill of Rights, unlike the Declaration of Independence, did not invoke divinity, but
rested its claims on natural law and social contract. See W. ADAMS, supra note 92, at 157. See supra
notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
161. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 500.
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kingship, with its oppressive power and standing army. By 1787, however,
this notion was turned on its head. According to James Madison, a key
political theorist at the Philadelphia convention, the new assessment was
that a republican government could best survive in a large geographic area.
This was so because such an expanse of territory would have many factions,
with no one group being able to dominate throughout the land.1 62 This in-
sight was crucial. It meant that a republic need not be considered merely a
relic of the past-a system of government only possible in small city-states,
and even then doomed to fall.16
3
"Mixed Government"
Concepts of "mixed government" were changing as well. In 1776, soci-
ety was said to be comprised of three distinct interests or estates-monar-
chy, aristocracy, and the people. 164 By 1787, consolidationists like Madison
took the position that all governmental institutions represented the peo-
ple. 165 Yet, there was still need to have diverse institutions, not because they
mirrored distinct elements in society, but rather because a division of power
between the central government and the states, and a further separation of
power within the national government, would best assure liberty.1 66 At the
time the Articles were drafted and the first state constitutions came into
being, "liberty" was thought best protected by housing sovereign power in
the local government legislatures. Indeed, many state leaders were suspi-
cious of any effort to increase central power, fearing a new, American des-
potism. 167 A decade later, however, consolidationists at the Philadelphia
Convention willingly endorsed the idea that only a strengthened, national
government, with powers divided, could best achieve protection from "for-
eign and domestic" enemies.
"Sovereignty"
In the middle of the political battles, of course, lay the concept of "sov-
ereignty." 168 Americans took the position early on that sovereignty lay With
the people.1 69 That Whig view could be traced to classical Greece, and then
to Thomas Hooker in the seventeenth century and through him to the co10-
162. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 63-64 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); see also G. WooD,
supra note 23, at 356; H. HENDERSON, PARTY POLITICS IN THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 431
(1974) (A stable republic was said to depend on consensus, most feasible in a small geographic area.).
163. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, at 122; W. ADAMS, supra note 92, at 24-25.
164. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 153.
165. Id. at 603.
166. Id. at 604; THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347, 348 (J. Madison) (. Cooke ed. 1961). Most of
the new state constitutions, while giving lip service to the principle of separation of powers, vested
almost unlimited power in the legislature. See Corwin, supra note 59, at 96; R. MORRIS, supra note
76, at 125-26. However, the Massachusetts and New York constitutions were exceptions that pro-
vided meaningful examples of executive and judicial power and proved influential with the framers
of the 1787 Constitution. See infra note 193.
167. McLaughlin, Articles of Confederation, in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
44 (L. Levy ed. 1969); M. JENSEN, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 26, at xix.
168. Mahoney, Sovereignty, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTIUTION, supra note
6, at 1714.
169. "[G]overnxment originates in a donation by the people. [That view was] as old as classical
Greece." Morgan, supra note 158, at 367.
[Vol. 31
HeinOnline  -- 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 96 1989
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
nists. 170 But could the grant of sovereign power be divided among govern-
ment institutions? John Adams continued to hold the traditional view that a
grant from the people would necessarily be indivisible. 171 But by 1787, a
novel "divided sovereignty" compound, dividing power between the central
government and the states, formed the underpinning of the new
constitution. 172
"Federalism"
Closely tied to the new ideas about sovereignty lay another key concept,
"federalism." In 1776, it was thought of as referring to a loose confederation
of sovereign states. Thus, a central legislature should merely propose laws;
it should have only limited power to act directly upon individuals and no
power to tax or to regulate interstate commerce. 1 73 By the time of the Con-
stitutional Convention, the term was captured by the consolidationists, who
labeled their opponents "Anti-Federalists" and themselves "Federalists."
Federalism was now used to describe the dual government system that had
been formed. Along with the states, this system had a national government
of broad powers supreme in its sphere. The central government possessed its
own enforcement mechanisms in a President and a court system; it could
reach individuals directly, and it had powers to tax and to regulate com-
merce. Madison described this new Federalist creature as a hybrid national-
federal compound. 174
THE GOVERNMENT UNDER THE ARTICLES: A TRAINING GROUND
Not only was the period of the 1770s and 1780s a fertile one in which
ideas about governance were in flux; it was also a time when persons could
try out their philosophies. Confederation government would serve as a
training ground for the men who would later be delegates at the Philadelphia
Convention and who would serve in important seats of power. Young lead-
ers like Hamilton and Madison gained valuable experience, principally at the
national level, and they began to develop a "vision of national politics"' 175 to
resolve the problems of the Confederation. Other members of the Continen-
tal Congress later became delegates to the Philadelphia Convention or to the
state ratifying conventions, or they served in the first several Congresses
starting in 1789. Indeed, more than half the Congressmen and Senators in
the very first Congress previously had been members of the Continental
Congress. 176 Many of them made their mark in the early executive adminis-
170. Levy, supra note 95, at 355.
171. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, at 145.
172. See supra note 166, infra note 173 and accompanying text.
173. Scheiber, supra note 69, at 697.
174. In its foundation, it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary
powers of the Government are drawn, it is partly federal, and partly national; in the opera-
tion of these powers, it is national, not federal: In the extent of them again, it is federal, not
national: And finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither
wholly federal, nor wholly national.
THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 250, 257 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
To Madison, the new government form was a "novelty." Scheiber, supra note 69, at 697.
175. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, at 42.
176. H. HENDERSON, supra note 162, at 434 (including two-thirds of the first Senate).
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trations. Besides Madison and Hamilton, they included John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, John Jay, and James Monroe. Each of them drew upon
their earlier experiences as they entered upon new duties. Lesser-known
members of the Continental Congress, or of the bureaucracies of that body,
came to occupy key chairs in the new administrations after 1789. Moreover,
bureaucracies of the Continental Congress177 saw their staffs move into the
front offices of the new presidential branch.178
Confederation Leaders-Madison and Washington
During this Confederation period, two leaders in particular, Madison
and Washington, rose above the rest. The two engaged in activities that
would lead the way in making the enterprise in Philadelphia a success.
Forced by the Articles' "three year out of six" rule179 to relinquish his seat
in Congress, James Madison returned home to Virginia in 1783. Nonethe-
less, his work for a broader republicanism and strengthened union contin-
ued. He demonstrated his commitment to religious freedom by opposing
efforts to provide state financial support for teachers of religion.180 Ever
seeking ways to assure viable national power, he urged his colleagues in the
state legislature to enforce the terms of the peace treaty. Indeed, along with
Hamilton, he took a leadership role in the consolidationist movement, induc-
ing his legislature to issue a call for the Annapolis Convention of 1786 and
advocating a general convention the following year.181
Clearly most important, however, Madison used his time away from
Philadelphia to engage in a systematic study of government and history, pro-
ducing seminal ideas. These included his thoughts about the nature of re-
publics, and about mechanisms for checking and balancing power.182
177. These included the departments of foreign affairs, Indian relations, war, finance, and postal
services.
178. J. SANDERS, EVOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789 (1971); C. THATCH JR., CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-89-STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1969); Guggenheimer, Development of the Executive Departments
1775-89, in Jameson, supra note 84, at 116-85; M. JENSEN, NEW NATION, supra note 26, at 348; A.
KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 24, at 96-97. "Had the Confederation government lasted, it is
probable that the various departments would have drawn together under the control of a single
executive committee or cabinet. Indeed the Committee of the States, established in 1784, was a step
in that direction .... Id. at 47.
179. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V, cl. 2.
180. Brant, Madison Heritage, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882, 888 (1960).
181. Id. at 889.
182. James Madison [would outdistance] all the other delegates by his initial preparation [as
well as] his sustained and ubiquitous efforts in the Convention.
.. [He prepared two influential papers.] One was his lengthy analysis and criticism
of the pattern of weakness he discovered in the history of ancient and modern confedera-
tions. His diagnosis of the decline and fall of the Lycian, Amphictyonic, Achaean, Hel-
vetic, Belgic, and Germanic confederacies reverted usually to the theme that the decisive
fault lay in the inadequate powers of the federal authority over its member states. The
second-a short outline ... emphasized the American experience .... If anything, this
short piece, entitled "Vices of the Political System of the United States," is the more conse-
quential, since Madison's seminal ideas of an extensive republic with certain vigorous fea.
tures of a national state would be applied in the Convention, employed.., in the debates in
the Virginia Ratifying Convention, and elaborated with sharper and more finished logic in
his essays for The Federalist.
Editor's "Introduction" in J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATE IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at xiii, xiii-xv (A. Koch ed. 1966) [hereinafter NOTES OF DEBATE]; Speech of J. Madison,
(Vol. 31
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Drawing upon his decade of experience within his home state and with con-
tinental affairs, the young Virginian became "unquestionably the leading
spirit"1 8 3 at the Convention of 1787.
By the end of the Revolutionary War, Madison's compatriot, George
Washington, was already a great hero. It is instructive, however, to consider
his impact beyond his status as General. For one thing, he was instrumental
in forging interstate commercial cooperation between Virginia and Mary-
land, a process which would lead to both the Annapolis and Philadelphia
Conventions. Washington owned vast holdings of land in the West and
partly as a result of concerns about his own financial situation, he urged
Maryland and Virginia to work together to solve the problems of Potomac
River navigation. 184 Indeed, he became the president of the Potomac River
project, an effort that envisioned passage into the interior-from the Poto-
mac through the Chesapeake, to the Ohio River, and then on to the Great
Lakes.185 But more than that effort, Washington was simply the indispensa-
ble man of the consolidationist cause; for to his countrymen, he symbolized
the American Union.18 6 That fact was recognized by his colleagues. In-
deed, he was prevailed upon by Madison, Hamilton, and others to preside at
the Convention in Philadelphia. All delegates at the Convention looked to-
ward him and what they believed was his example of "[e]nergy, probity,
disinterestedness and a magnificent tactfulness" as they discussed the new
office of the presidency.187
A Changed Attitude
By 1787, consolidationist arguments gained force, especially among the
younger, more continental-minded individuals. 188 Undoubtedly, this recep-
tivity was fostered by heightened efforts to increase national power. Inter-
state networks "replicated the growth of groups opposed to British policy
two decades earlier."18 9 However, the new attitude was explained less by
such organized efforts than by the simple fact that the times had changed.
Indeed, the Constitution of 1787, "unthinkable in 1776, [and] impossible in
1781, or at any time before it was framed,"' 90 had become a realistic goal by
1787. The Articles proved an "indispensable transitional stage." 191 Many
more Americans were now willing to accept what they bitterly resisted
Vices of the Political System of the United States (1787), quoted in P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, supra
note 2, at 166-69.
183. NOTES OF DEBATE, supra note 182, at xvii (quoting Max Farrand).
184. A. WEINSTEIN & R. WILSON, supra note 14, at 167, 172. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, at
98. Washington was involved in a "massive engineering project to connect the Potomac, Shenan-
doah and Ohio River Valleys by a system of locks and canals."
185. A. WEINSTEIN & R. WILSON, supra note 14, at 172.
186. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
187. C. THATCH, supra note 178, at 65.
188. C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 759 (1937).
189. See R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, and accompanying text.
190. Levy, supra note 95, at 376, 379. Even in 1787, had the Framers called for ratification by
the state legislatures, passage would have been doubtful. Id. "Not even the Constitution would have
been ratified if its Framers had submitted it for approval to the state legislatures that kept Congress
paralyzed in the 1780's." Id.
191. Id.
HeinOnline  -- 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 99 1989
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
twenty years earlier.1 92 They no longer dwelt upon the fears and deep suspi-
cions of strong central taxing and commerce power-British or American.
There was a broader agreement that the central authority had to be substan-
tially increased. The new powers were needed to guard against dangers
posed by the British and the Indian tribes; to end state trade wars; and,
thought fervent consolidationists, to protect against domestic threats to
property and credit.
THE ARTICLES: A FAILED MODEL TO LEARN FROM
Ready to strengthen central power, consolidationists looked to the Arti-
cles and to the experiences under them. Thus, the Articles served as the key
model of government, albeit an unsuccessful plan, a first try at a Union that
would prove invaluable at Philadelphia. Doubtless, the state constitutions-
and the practices under them-were also an influence upon the Framers. 193
Max Farrand, the foremost constitutional scholar at the turn of the twenti-
eth century, declared that the Framers seldom went outside their own exper-
iences while piecing together the new constitution. They saw their task as
one of remedying definite defects, each of which had been revealed in the
experience of the previous ten years.1 94 Almost every single provision in the
192. Farrand, Federal Constitution and the Defects of the Confederation, 2 AM. POL. SCl. A.
REV. 532, 544 (1908).
193. In focusing upon the significance of the Articles, the author does not mean to discount the
role of the state constitutions. The latter played an integral role in the rich mosaic of political action
and theory that resulted in the 1787 document. Consolidationists both looked upon the example of
republican state constitutions with pride and sought to assure that the national government could be
protected from abuses being carried out under those charters.
mhe experiment in state constitution-making provided a depth of experience upon
which the Framers of the federal Constitution drew .... Speaking of the Massachusetts
Constitution, John Adams quite rightly referred to it as 'Locke, Sidney and Rousseau and
DeMably reduced to practice.' Separation of powers, checks and balances, a strong execu-
tive, an independent judiciary could be found in some, in by no means all, of the state
constitutions, while the need to add a Bill of Rights to the federal constitution attested to
the popularity of the provisions almost universally incorporated by the states either in their
constitutions or their evolving legal systems.
R. MoRRIs, supra note 76, at 129.
The new instrument reproduced the main features of the Massachusetts constitution of
1780: the strong president, the senate, the house of representatives, the partial executive
veto, the independent judiciary, the separation and balance of power .... The president
[was not] designated by the legislative assembly, like the president in Pennsylvania and
governors in the Southern States.
Quoted in Palmer, supra note 158, at 91-92.
John Adams, a major influence in state constitution-making, considered the New York constitu-
tion "by far the best . . . yet adopted" since the executive was stronger than in the others. R.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, at 52, 56.
But Madison cautioned that a strengthened national government was needed to confine state
abuses as well. In his Vices position paper, discussed supra in note 182, Madison attacked the states
for failing to comply with the requisitions of Congress, for violations of treaties, and for trespassing
on the rights of others. See Corwin, supra note 83, at 113-14. He also reserved the "strongest words
of condemnation" for the "vicious legislation" in the states. Id. at 114.
Therefore, Madison deemed the "most important" of the proposed amendments he submitted in
the first congress in 1789 the one that would have prohibited state abuses of basic rights. R. MOR-
RIs, supra note 76, at 319. At times, courageous state judges stood firm against legislative interfer-
ence with court operation. Id. at 125-26.
194. Farrand, supra note 192, at 532.
It was a time when men indulged in philosophical speculation and in political theorizing,
but farmers and traders are practical people, and the compelling characteristic of the fram-
ers of the constitution was hard-headed 6ommon sense. While several of the delegates in
[VCol. 31
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Constitution can be attributed to such an examination. 195 Of course, the
Framers could not have foreseen every development. 196 Nor could they do
more than speculate about the dimensions of the new branches of govern-
ment that the Constitution created--especially an independent presidency
and an independent federal judiciary. Moreover, even though the Continen-
tal Congress had established a national Bank of North America, 197 the
Framers could not foresee the breadth of the role of such an institution.
Borrowing from the Articles
Major ideas were lifted bodily from the Articles. 198 These included the
central government's power of war and peace, 199 the power to make trea-
ties,2°° and the power to borrow20' and coin.20 2 There continued to be pro-
tection of national legislators for their speeches in the halls of Congress. 20 3
The states were still forbidden to enter into treaties,2°4 make war,205 join
alliances, 20 6 or grant titles of nobility.20 7 Once more, there were assurances
of interstate comity and equality. Out-of-state citizens were again guaran-
teed the privileges and immunities of in-staters.20 8 In addition, states were
still required to recognize another state's records and judicial proceedings. 20 9
Finally, the obligation to return fugitive slaves remained.210
Great Departures from the Articles
Despite the adoption of these provisions from the Articles, changes
were so substantial21' that a new, intricate model had to replace the Articles.
preparation for their task read quite extensively in history and government, when it came
to the concrete problems before them they seldom, if ever, went outside of their own expe-
rience and observation.
M. FARRAND, FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 52 (1913).
195. Farrand, supra note 192, at 540.
196. For example, they could not have anticipated the impact of population growth beyond the
Appalachians, the Embargo device of 1807, and the protective tariff of 1816. Id. at 542.
197. Note, supra note 53, at 163.
198. But see R. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT THE CREATION-HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY AND THE
CONSTITUTION 217 (1985). He minimizes the importance of the Articles as a model. The Commit-
tee of Detail at the Federal Convention of 1787, he says, "adopted or paraphrased a number of
clauses in the old Articles of Confederation, perhaps to convey the illusion that the Constitution was
a mere revision of the Articles-afiction that was transparent to everyone." Id. (Emphasis added).
199. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. I with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11
and art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
200. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 1 with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
201. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cls. 6, 7 with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
202. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cls. 4, 5, 6 with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
5.
203. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V, ci. 5 with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
204. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 1 with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
205. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, cl. 5 with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
206. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, cls. 1, 2 with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.
207. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, el. 1 With U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, el. 1.
208. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, cl. 1 with U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
209. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, cl. 3 with U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
210. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, cl. 2 with U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
211. However, the new Constitution would
not represent a counter-revolution or a restoration ... but simply the extension of central-
izing tendencies that had existed since the beginning of the war for independence .... The
presidential system at the federal level can be ascribed [not to a desire to install the
1989]
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Requisitions under the Articles had only brought in about one-sixth the al-
lotted amounts.2 12 Accordingly, the national government needed the power
to tax individuals directly.2 13 The power to regulate commerce among the
states was added in order to end state trade wars.2 14 The Framers removed
the requirement of unanimity needed for amendment; 2 15 no amendment had
ever made it through that roadblock. Instead, amendments to the new con-
stitution required for enactment the approval of only two-thirds of the Con-
gress and three-fourths of the states.2 16 Rather than the two-thirds vote
generally required to pass important legislation,2 17 a simple majority now
sufficed-except in the instances of amendment,2 18 treaty-making, 2 19 and the
vote necessary to override a presidential veto.220 A unified, independent,
and powerful presidency replaced the collective boards and committees an-
swerable to the Continental Congress.22 1 The new United States Govern-
ment committed itself to guaranteeing each state a "republican form of
government" under the Constitution.222 Instead of a federal court depen-
dent for its existence upon the old Cohtinental Congress and possessed of
limited jurisdiction, 223 the Constitution established an independent court
system. There was now broad judicial power in the central government, in-
cluding at least a national Supreme Court.2 24
The Articles' "supremacy clause" 22 5 was also strengthened. The Con-
stitution required state judges and other state officials, along with federal
officers and legislators, to take individual oaths to abide by the provisions of
the new Constitution. 226 The document also acknowledged the new Consti-
tution, federal laws in pursuance of that fundamental law, and treaties made
"under the Authority of the United States" as the "Supreme Law."'227
Furthermore, there was a major redesign of the national legislature. In-
equivalent of a monarchy but] much more to the beliefs of the authors of the first state
constitutions that free government, stability, and efficiency were most likely to be found
with the combination of governor, assembly, and courts to which they were accustomed
from colonial times, and to the fact that the architects of the Federal Constitution of 1787
adhered to the outline of the familiar building plan.
W. ADAMS, supra note 92, at 290.
212. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
213. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
214. Id. at cl. 3.
215. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII, cl. 1.
216. U.S. CONST. art. V.
217. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 6.
218. U.S. CONST. art. V.
219. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
220. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
221. U.S. CONST. art. If. The Continental Congress was "burdened with legislative and admin.
istrative responsibilities unprecedented in the colonial past, and the most debilitating weakness it
suffered ultimately lay in its own inefficiency." J. RAKOVE, supra note 29, at 185. The independent,
unified national executive was designed, in part, to overcome that weakness. Id.
222. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
223. Eg., a federal appeals court in cases of capture, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl.
1; and a complex arbitration procedure in cases of state disputes and land grant litigation, ARTICLES
OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cls. 2, 3.
224. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
225. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII, cl. 1.
226. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cls. 2, 3.
227. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cL. 2.
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stead of a unicameral legislature, there were now two houses.228 Moreover,
the new legislative membership could establish a base of authority independ-
ent of the states. Although United States Senators were to be chosen by
their respective state legislatures, Senators and Representatives were not lim-
ited as to the period of time they could hold office. They now voted as indi-
-viduals and they could not be removed by their home states. In contrast,
members of the Continental Congress could serve only three years in every
six year period,229 they voted as a unit,230 and they were subject to recall. 2 31
Finally, unlike its predecessor, the new Congress was given specific authority
to govern territory under the domain.232
THE LEGAL CULTURE OF THE 1780s
The Articles played a vital role for the Framers. More important, per-
haps, they instruct us even today. In studying the Confederation period, we
learn about the environment in which the Framers worked. The legal cul-
ture of the time included a mix of several elements: pragmatism, natural law,
common law, a unique written constitution, and a judicial role in
enforcement.
The delegates to the Continental Congress and the younger, more conti-
nental-minded leaders who framed our second charter, the Constitution,
were first and foremost pragmatists. They construed their mandates expan-
sively in order to achieve what they thought was necessary. Of course, that
spirit had been reflected even earlier as Americans interpreted colonial char-
ters. Thus, despite the fact that such charters were written in the language
of a grant, the colonists denied that the charters could be forfeited. Any
such restrictive terms were interpreted as mere "form and not . .. sub-
stance. ' 233 Like the Magna Carta, charters were said to be reciprocal, how-
ever they might be phrased. They were the "recognition, not the source, of
the people's liberties. '234
As for the members of the Continental Congress, they readily assumed
the role of an ad hoc government even before ratification of the Articles.
Beginning in 1774, the Congress sought to exercise extensive "political, mili-
tary, and economic power over the colonists. Even absent a written charter,
the legislative body adopted commercial codes, established and maintained
an army, issued a continental currency, erected a military code of law, de-
fined crimes against the Union, and sent officials to negotiate abroad. '235
Furthermore, the Congress began acquiring western territory, established a
federal court of appeal in cases of capture of prizes, and permitted the
228. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
229. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V, cl. 2.
230. Id. at cl. 4.
231. Id. at cI. 1.
232. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
233. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 269.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 355. The states, especially after 1781, however, treated Congressional resolutions as
"mere recommendations." Id. at 356. "Congressional power, which had been substantial during the
war years, now began precipitously to disintegrate .... By the middle eighties, Congress had virtu-
ally ceased trying to govern." Id. at 359. See also Note, supra note 53, at 142, 163.
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seizure of property by the Continental Army.2 3 6
Enactment of the Articles witnessed a continuation of this pragmatic
Congressional attitude. Thus, without specific authority,237 the Congress
continued to acquire land and to establish and implement mechanisms for
governing the territory. The legislature enacted a far-reaching bill of rights
for the Northwest Territory, and it authorized disposition of sections of the
territory in order to defray part of the central government's debts.238 In
addition, the Continental Congress established the Bank of North America
to ease wartime shortages of capital, even while the step was being assailed
as wholly unauthorized. 239 The Bank's supporters, like James Wilson, none-
theless considered the Bank's creation justified under the central govern-
ment's general powers since the financial situation could not be dealt with by
individual states.24° James Madison later supported these expansive inter-
pretations of the Articles, given the charter's defects.241
Many members concurred as to the necessity to construe the Articles
flexibly,242 although there was reluctance to take the ultimate step: adopting
amefidments for a tax power and a commerce authority, absent state una-
nimity. Madison identified Article XIII as a "general and implied power" of
Congress to enforce the Articles against recalcitrant states.243 Indeed, al-
most immediately after the Articles came into being in 1781, a Committee of
Congress interpreted Article XIII similarly, although the committee also
sought to propose an amendment to make such a power official.244 James
Monroe urged implied authority as well, 245 in particular to compel the states
to meet their requisition assessments; however, such compulsion was re-
jected. But the Congress by March 1787 did adopt a resolution that denied
the right of a state legislature to enact laws in conflict with a treaty and that
called upon local judges to uphold the treaty's provisions.246 Apparently, a
236. Note, supra note 53, at 150-51; Young, supra note 59, at 1575; Jameson, supra note 84, at
28-29.
237. Harmon, supra note 16, at 306.
238. It is true, however, that authority to govern the territory may be inferred from the general
acquisition of the land, the fact of possession, and the circumstances under which the Articles were
adopted. McLaughlin, supra note 167, at 52; Note, supra note 53, at 142, 150; Treat, Origin ofthe
National Land System Under the Confederation, I ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AM. HIST. ASS'N 231-
33 (1906). See Harmon, supra note 16, at 306.
239. Note, supra note 53, at 163. "[IThe opposition to the exercise of a power not expressly
delegated remained so intense that the bank had to be rechartered by a state." Levy, supra note 95,
at 380.
240. Wilson thought it an example of a "situation in which an object occurs, to the direction of
which no state is competent .... ." Note, supra note 53, at 163.
241. A "list of the cases in which Congress have [sic] been betrayed, or forced by the defects of
the Confederation into violations of their chartered authorities, would not a little surprise those who
have paid no attention to the subject." Id. at 150. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 280; No. 44, at 303,
299 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
242. Note, supra note 53, at 150.
243. Congress could "enforce... [the Articles] against any of the states which shall refuse or
neglect to abide by such their determinations, or shall otherwise violate any such article." Brant,
Fightingfor Implied Powers, in JAMES MADISON, NATIONALIST 1780-87, at 104-20 (1948).
244. McLaughlin, supra note 15, at 142.
245. M. JENSEN, NEW NATION, supra note 26, at 419.
246. E. CORWIN, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration ofIndependence
and the Meeting ofthe Philadelphia Convention, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 19 (Ma-
son & Garvey eds. 1970).
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majority of state legislatures promptly endorsed the resolution. 247
The Framers' Pragmatism: Interpretation of Their Mandates
The delegates to the Philadelphia Convention viewed themselves as free
to follow the expansive example set by the members of the Continental Con-
gress before them. The February 21, 1787 call by Congress for a Convention
was only for the purpose of revising the Articles, and the convention was to
submit its work to Congress. Only upon the latter's approval were proposals
to be sent on to the states, and then only in conformity with the Articles'
amending procedure.
24 8
Yet the members in Philadelphia rejected mere revision of the Articles,
"boldly [disregarded] their instructions," 24 9 and instead chose to create an
entirely new frame of government. And "[o]nly the tremendous prestige of
many of the delegates and common recognition of the national danger could
secure acceptance of their work."' 250 Moreover, they declined to seek con-
gressional approval for their actions, and established an entirely new proce-
dure for ratification. The Constitution was to be declared ratified, not upon
the unanimous consent of the thirteen states through their 'state legislatures.
Rather, the approval of nine states would suffice, as manifested through spe-
cially chosen conventions.251 Presumably, the state convention route was
chosen because the Framers were aware that chances for approval of the
document, even by nine state legislatures, was sliM. 252
Some of the delegates were uneasy about the proposal to scrap the Arti-
cles entirely. Patterson, proponent of the New Jersey plan, objected in par-
ticular to the fact that ratification would require the assent of only nine
states.253 Gerry of Massachusetts dissented to the plan to change the gov-
ernment without seeking the approval of Congress.254 Even consolidationist
Hamilton shared those concerns.25 5 James Wilson's view, however, reflected
247. Id.
248. [S]uch Convention appearing to be the most probable means of establishing ... a firm
national government . . . . [the call was for] revising the articles of confederation and
reporting to Congress and the several Legislatures, such alterations and provisions therein,
as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the states [be enacted].
THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 259 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
A like call in September 1786 by the Annapolis Convention was
to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitu-
tion of the [federal] Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union; ... to report
such an act... to the United States in Congress assembled... and afterwards confirmed
by the Legislatures of every State, will effectually provide for the same.
Id. at 258.
249. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 24, at 116.
250. Id.
251. U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 1.
252. Levy, supra note 95, at 379.
253. "If the confederacy was radically wrong, let us return to our States, and obtain larger pow-
ers, not assume them ourselves .... What is unanimously done, must be unanimously undone."
NoTEs oF DEBATE, supra note 182, at 122-23 (reported by James Madison) (A. Koch Introduction
1966) (Statement of Patterson June 9, 1787).
254. Id. at 611 (Statement of Gerry Sept. 10, 1787).
255. Hamilton concurred with Mr. Gerry as to the in-decorum of not requiring the appro-
bation of Congress. He considered this as a necessary ingredient in the transaction. He
thought it wrong also to allow nine States... to institute a new Government on the ruins
of the existing one. He would propose that the constitution should be sent to Congress in
1989]
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that of the majority of the delegates: "With regard to the power of the Con-
vention, he conceived himself authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at
liberty to propose anything. ' 256 Ultimately, the delegates at Philadelphia de-
cided that instead of seeking the approval of Congress, they would merely
have the document "laid before the [United] States in Congress assem-
bled," 257 requesting the Congress to forward it to the states for their
consideration. 25 8
Madison, "Father of the Constitution," found no impropriety either in
framing a new constitution or in departing from the Articles' amending pro-
cess. He emphasized that the Framers were acting in accord with a mandate
to establish a national government adequate to the exigencies of the Union,
taking into account both the call of the Annapolis Convention and that of
the Continental Congress. 259 He noted that the "most plausible" objection
was to the requirement that only nine states' approval would suffice for rati-
fication (and that approval only by convention). Yet that objection was
hardly voiced.260 He observed that strict literalists could have questioned
the legitimacy of the Convention itself.261
Principle and Practicality
Pragmatism was an attribute of the constitutional founders of the 1770s
and 1780s. "It was this tempered combination of adherence to ideals and
pragmatism in concrete situations that made possible the comparatively
quick, smooth, and successful founding of the American constitutional sys-
tem."'262 Because they might prove too controversial and be an obstacle to
achieving a national union, challenges to slavery, efforts to expand the vote,
order that the same if approved by them may be communicated to the State Legislatures, to
the end that they may refer it to State Conventions; each Legislature declaring that if the
Convention of the State should think the plan ought to take effect among nine ratifying
States, the same should take effect accordingly.
Id. at 611 (Statement of Hamilton Sept. 10, 1787).
256. Id. at 125 (Statement of James Wilson June 16, 1787).
257. Id. at 634 (Comm. of Stile Sept. 13, 1787).
258. Id.
259. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 260-61 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
260. Madison declared that the objection was the "least urged [owing to the] irresistible convic-
tion of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of 12 States, to the perverseness or corruption of a thir-
teenth; from the example of the inflexible opposition given by a majority of 1/60th of the people of
America." Id. at 263.
261. Madison reminded critics that there were
twelve States, who usurped the power of sending deputies to the Convention, a body utterly
unknown to their constitutions; Congress who recommended the appointment of this body,
equally unknown to the confederation; and ... the State of New York, in particular, who
first urged and then complied with this unauthorized interposition.
Id. at 266.
262. W. ADAMS, supra note 92, at 98. "The genius of Jeffersonian philosophy was intuitive and
practical .... Government was not the expression of a political theory, but the largely unreflective
answer of healthy men to the threat of tyranny." D. BOORSTIN, supra note 145, at 237.
[Given] the basically undoctrinaire character of the American Revolution ... even guiding
principles remained subject to the test of practicability. Where the test revealed irrecon-
ciliability with existing interests and institutions, where no compromise could be reached
between the ideal and the practical, the ideal was-at least temporarily-abandoned.
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and some claims for religious accommodation were shunted aside.2 63 This
pragmatic attitude was expressed by "such diverse political temperaments as
John Adams and Patrick Henry. '264 The Founders knew that racial dis-
crimination and slavery were not compatible with the principles of freedom
and equality. "But economic and political interests outweighed ideological
considerations .... The cohesion of the newly formed nation clearly had
priority over the realization of the postulate of equality." 265
That practical bent continued into the early 1800s, and was later re-
flected in the constitutional interpretations of men like Jefferson and Mar-
shall. For example, President Jefferson adopted a practical resolution to the
Louisiana Territory challenge, one at odds with his philosophical bent to-
ward strict construction. The problem he confronted was whether to accept
the French offer of the entire territory. He came to support the purchase of
the vast region, even absent any specific provision in the Constitution au-
thorizing it. He well understood the grave risks to America posed by a for-
eign power continuing to border the young republic. He sadly
acknowledged at the time, however, that failure to pass an amendment made
the Constitution "a blank paper by construction."2 66
John Marshall also appreciated practical necessity as he took his seat as
Chief Justice. Important to him, in addition to constitutional principle, was
an "empiricism in not tying the Court to rigid formulas. ' 267 Only through
flexible construction would a powerful Court emerge, given the complex fed-
eral system.268 His Marbury2 69 opinion is an example of his masterwork in
practical politics to strengthen the Court, while identifying vested rights.270
The Legal Culture: Natural Law
The pragmatic delegates to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 were
developing their constitutional weave from a myriad of confusing strands
present in the 1780s. As a result, no one judicial mode of interpretation of
the 1787 document, or of the amendments that followed, can truly claim
legitimacy.
Besides pragmatism, another thread in the weave was the notion of nat-
ural law. A higher law took precedence over ordinary legislation, and that
W. ADAMS, supra note 92, at 118.
263. W. ADAMS, supra note 92. at 98, 118 (constituent power ... was exercised "only with
certain limitations").
264. Id. at 118-19.
265. Id. at 180-81.
266. Peterson, Constitutional History 1801-29, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONsTI-
TUTiON, supra note 6, at 394. Jefferson said that failure of an amendment expressly to authorize the
Louisiana Purchase would make the Constitution "a blank paper by construction;" yet he went
along. Id.
267. F. FRANKFURTER, COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 14-15
(1937).
268. Id.
269. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
270. See generally R. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 40-47 (1960); Nelson,
Eighteenth Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV.
893 (1978); Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1; Craven, Paean
to Pragmatism, 50 N.C.L. REv. 977, 992 (1972); Bloch & Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of
History in Madison v. Marbury, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 301, 302.
1989]
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law could not be completely codified by a constitution. 27' Earlier, in Dr.
Bonham's Case,272 Lord Coke drew upon ancient and medieval ideas and
asserted that "common right and reason" 273 was superior even to acts of
Parliament.274 That position was restated by James Otis, in Paxton's Case275
in 1761. William Paca, a judge of the Continental Congress's federal court
of appeal in cases of capture raised the basic question: did the rights of
Americans "[rest] upon... charters .... Or did they deduce [rights] from a
higher source, the laws of God and nature?"276 As if to answer Paca, coun-
sel James Varnum in Trevett v. Weeden 277 invoked "natural law" in chal-
lenging legislation in Rhode Island.278 Reflecting the loose connotation of
the word "law" in eighteenth century America, he also invoked "the Rhode
Island charter," "general principles," "invariable custom," "Magna Carta,"
"fundamental law," and "the law of God."'27 9
The force of the natural law argument, existing in the 1780s, continued
as the Supreme Court began to hear and decide cases. For example, in Cal-
der v. Bull 280 Justice Chase declared that there are "certain vital principles
in our free Republican governments which will determine and over-rule an
271. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 715-16 (1975).
For the generation that framed the Constitution, the concept of a 'higher law' protecting
'natural rights' and taking precedence over ordinary positive law as a matter of political
obligation was widely shared and deeply felt. An essential element of American constitu-
tionalism was reduction to written form-and hence to positive law--of some of the princi-
ples of natural rights. But at the same time, it was generally recognized that written
constitutions could not completely codify the higher law. Thus in the framing of the origi-
nal American constitutions it was widely accepted that there remained unwritten but still
binding principles of higher law. The ninth amendment is the textual expression of this
idea in the federal Constitution.
272. Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke Rep. 107 (C.P. 1610).
273. "The Common Law will controul (sic.) Acts of Parliament, [and] adjudge them to be ut-
terly void, when they are against 'common right and reason.'" Gunther, supra note 83, at 1054,
1055. Coke's statement was not even "respectable OBITER DICTA." The actions of the Privy
Council in invalidating Colonial legislation, on rare occasion, were more relevant. Id. at 1056.
274. It should be noted that Coke objected to interference with substantive rights, especially by
the Crown, rather than to a fusion of legislative and judicial powers. Such a fusion in the "High
court of Parliament" represented Coke's "teachings (as) the highest of all legal authorities before
Blackstone." Corwin, supra note 83, at 97. Thus it was understandable that early constitutional
practices in the new states had a similar fusion, dominated by the legislature. "[E]qually important,
the Cokian doctrine corresponded exactly to the contemporary necessities of many of the colonies in
the earlier days of their existence." Id. In contrast, Locke declared limits on legislative jurisdiction,
contending that the "legislative or supreme authority cannot assume to itself a power to rule by
extemporary arbitrary decrees." Id. at 105.
275. Cuddihy, James Otis Jr., in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra
note 6, at 1351. "To say the Parliament is absolute and arbitrary is a contradiction .... Should an
act of Parliament be against any of [God's] natural laws.., their declaration would be contrary to
eternal truth, equity and justice, and consequently void."
276. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 291, 291-94 ("Ambiguity of American Law"). "Putting
[rights] on parchment did not create them; it only affirmed their natural existence." Id. at 294.
Accordingly, as Otis had so strongly argued: "the rights and principles of the Constitution did not
have to be specified and written down to be in force." Id. At the same time "the Americans were
firmly committed to the modern notion of law, based on legislative enactment" and "apprehensive of
the possible arbitrariness and uncertainties of judicial discretion." Id. at 295, 304.
277. Corwin, supra note 246, at 11 (also Corwin, supra note 83, at 104).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power. ' 281 And in Fletcher v.
Peck,282 Chief Justice Marshall declared a state statute unconstitutional, in
part because it violated "general principles which are common to our free
institutions," 283 notably that of the inviolability of vested rights.
Interpreting a Writing
Notwithstanding ideas of natural law, America's constitution was now
embodied in a written document. That development was momentous. It
provided the opportunity for systematic judicial construction.284 To some
extent, at least, the Articles of Confederation had also been regarded by
courts as amenable to judicial interpretation and enforcement. 285 But the
Constitution, with its independent federal judiciary, now offered a far greater
opportunity for involvement of the courts.
The Common Law
The common law heritage was also a key element in that weave of con-
stitutionalism in the 1780s. To what extent were common law principles
useful in judicial interpretation of the Constitution? However Americans
might rebel against British political rule, they did not cast out the common
law. True, it now had to take account of local American circumstances;
nonetheless, the common law continued to be revered on this side of the
Atlantic. 286 Thus, once constitutional principles became identified primarily
with a fixed written document, the drafters at Philadelphia-and the dele-
gates to the state ratifying conventions--could draw upon their common law
training in construing it. The Americans, of course, lacked a significant tra-
dition of judicial interpretation of written constitutions. Obviously, no soci-
281. Id. at 388. But see Justice Iredell, disputing the authority of courts to invoke natural law to
strike down laws. Id. at 398-99.
282. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
283. Id. at 139.
284. "America's innovation was to identify 'the Constitution' with a single normative document
instead of a historical tradition, and thus to create the possibility of treating constitutional interpre-
tation as an exercise in the traditional legal activity of construing a written instrument." Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885, 902 (1985).
285. Id.; see also supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
286. "With the Revolution, most of the state constitutions provided for the retention of as much
of the English statute and common law as were applicable to the local circumstances. ... G.
WOOD, supra note 23, at 300-01. Blackstone continued to be cited with approval into the 19th
century. See Story, Rules of Interpretation, in 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 382-83, 400 (1833). In contrast, his views on Parliamentary supremacy, "What
Parliament doth, no power on earth can undo," were rejected. Levy, supra note 95, at 355 (quoting
Blackstone's Commentaries). His conception of a freedom of speech limited to the absence of prior
restraint was also rejected. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931). "The liberty of the
press... consists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in freedom from censure
[even] for criminal matter when published." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151, 152 (1766).
Compare Justice Holmes' opinion in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) with his opinion in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). "In the first century of American independence, the
Commentaries were not merely an approach to the study of law .... The influence of Blackstone's
ideas on the framers of the Federal Constitution is well known." D. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS
SCIENCE OF THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON BLACKSTONE'S Commentaries-Showing How Blackstone,
Employing Eighteenth Century Ideas of Science, Religion, History, Aesthetics, and Philosophy,
Made of the Law at Once a Conservative and a Mysterious Science 3 (1941). See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (citing Blackstone).
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ety of the time had such a tradition. Yet the Framers "possessed almost an
embarrassment of [interpretive] riches in the common law's centuries of
dealing with wills, deeds, contracts, and statutes." 287
This was not to say that the common law could furnish a clear path of
constitutional interpretation; too many threshold questions remained to be
decided. First, what was that common law heritage? It was not always dis-
cernable. Blackstone was the foremost exponent of the common law in the
eighteenth century, but as he systemized the English common law, he fused
the science of the law with what he believed was its deep mystery. For sci-
ence was not enough; there must also be a "decent veil to protect ultimate
values from the devouring gaze of Reason. ' 288 Blackstone's Commentaries
had many contradicting ways of thinking, and reason was to be subordinated
to prior values.289 Yet despite the common law's supposed mystery, Black-
stone found no difficulty in invoking it to justify the Glorious Revolution of
1688. "However [that Revolution] might in some respects go beyond the
letter of our ancient laws [it] was agreeable to the spirit of our constitution
and the rights of human nature. '290
Beyond the difficulty of ascertaining common law principles in general
lay several other problems. How much discretion would a judge have in
accommodating existing common law principles to local conditions? More-
over, what would the common law instruct as to how to determine the
meaning of the document? For example, would the search be for the actual
intent of the makers, or for the "plain meaning" of the text? If plain mean-
ing, how obvious would that be to discover? Would canons of construction
have to be revised because there was no simple analogy to an ordinary stat-
ute-because, that is, the constitution was sui generis? Would the search for
meaning provide options based upon the "level of generality" chosen in in-
terpreting a clause's meaning? Who were the "makers" of the 1787 docu-
ment? How legitimate was legislative history in ascertaining meaning? How
important would court decisions be?
Dispute still continues as to the elements of that common law heritage.
To Raoul Berger, for example, one instruction was clear: the search was for
the actual intent of the Framers, even when that intent seemed to contradict
the supposed command of the text.291 In contrast, H. Jefferson Powell fo-
287. Powell, supra note 284, at 894.
288. "[E]ven the scholar of law must approach his subject with awe, and with the certainty that
there would be much that he could not understand .... [Tlhere were limits beyond which man
should not let his reason wander." D. BOORSTIN, supra note 286, at 25-26.
289. "[fln every document which attempts to subject institutions to rational analysis, the func-
tion of reason is in a sense subordinate. Reason must be used to show man the consequences of his
system of values and to persuade others to accept that system. But man must know his values and
he should be unafraid to assert them." Id. at 187, 191.
290. Id. at 29.
291. Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 296 (1986)[hereinafter "Original Intention"] "[E]verything which is within the intent of the makers of the Act,
although it be not within the letter, is as strongly within the Act as that which is within the letter and
intent also." Id. at 301 (citing Stowel v. Zouch, 1 Plowden 353, 366, 75 Eng. Rep. 536, 556 (Ex. Ch.
1569)).
Berger is critical of those who seek to discredit "original intent" because they believe it bars the
way to "judicial revision" of the Constitution. "[Tihe founders did not contemplate judges in the
'legislative,' policy-making role." R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 340 (1969). See
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cuses upon "not.. .what the drafters meant by their words," but how
judges reasonably construe a provision's language.292 Moreover, the dispute
is complicated by lack of agreement as to what evidence to consider, what
canons to invoke, and what other criteria to include. 293
Three decades after the Constitution was adopted, Chief Justice Mar-
shall emphasized the "plain meaning" canon. He declared that a provision's
spirit is "collected chiefly from its words. '294 Marshall added that the
words of the Constitution should be construed as used "in the common af-
fairs of the world or in approved authors" 295 at the time of enactment. Mar-
shall's colleague and constitutional scholar, Joseph Story, agreed with the
Chief Justice. Although the fundamental rule was that intent must be deter-
mined, such intent was to be found primarily by focusing upon the wording
used.
2 9 6
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT 300-12 (1977).
"The intention of the law maker is the law, rising even above the text." R. BERGER, FEDERAL-
ISM: FOUNDERS' DESIGN 15-17 (1987) (citing Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903)).
292. Powell, supra note 284, at 896 ("what judges .. .understood 'the reasonable and legal
meaning' of those words to be").
293. Examples of complexities in assessment of historical evidence include (a) differing foci and
interpretations of the evidence (see, eg., exchange of charges between Berger and Powell; Berger says
Powell has misread Selden, Blackstone, and Coke, "Original Intention, supra note 291, at 304-06;
Powell accuses Berger of misinterpreting Madison and Story, Powell, supra note 284, at 896 n.56);
(b) context ("artificial reason" of judge was used by Coke, not to minimize any search for actual
intent but rather as part of a lecture to a king who was seeking to usurp the court's judging role,
Berger "Original Intention," supra note 291, at 300, 306); (c) historical reality (legislative history was
not focused upon in the 18th century because there was no recorded legislative history then, id. at
307); (d) the absence of action (evidence that the Framers thought that the debates and records of
their convention were important is the fact that they did not destroy the journals and records, id. at
313); (e) inferences from proximity (given the records of five states ratifying conventions, there is
reason to assume that general agreement on "major issues reflects the sentiments of six adjoining
states," id. at 321); (f) non-time proximity (Madison's statement years later, since it was not an
"intention" simultaneously recorded, is to be given less weight, id. at 322); (g) minimizing the partic-
ular language chosen by Madison to comment on the issue (Madison, in distinguishing between
"true meaning" and "whatever may have been the opinions entertained in forming the Constitu-
tion," was only "reflect[ing] caution," id. at 325); and (h) principles of construction, Hamilton's
principles of construction, infra notes 310, 331 and accompanying text.
294. [A]lthough the spirit of an instrument, especially of a constitution, is to be respected
not less than its letter, yet the spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words. [I]f. .. the
plain meaning of a provision.., is to be disregarded, because we believe the framers...
could not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of
applying the provision to the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, with-
out hesitation, unite in rejecting the application....
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202-03 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (emphasis added).
See also Brest, Constitutional Interpretation, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION, supra note 6, at 464, 465.
295. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). "Necessary" as used "in the com-
mon affairs of the world, or in approved authors ... frequently imports no more than that one thing
is convenient, or useful, or essential to another." Id. at 413.
Subjective intent was a factor. "This word, ... like others, is used in various senses; and, in its
construction, the subject, the context, the intention of the person using [it], are all to be taken into
view." Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
296. The first and fundamental rule .., is to construe [instruments] according to the sense
of the terms, and the intention of the parties. Mr. Justice Blackstone has remarked, the
intention of a law is to be gathered from the words, the context, the subject matter, the
effects and consequences, or the reason and spirit of the law ... [W]ords are generally to be
understood in their usual and most known significance, their general and popular use ...
[W]here its words are plain, clear and determinate, they require no interpretation.
Story, supra note 286, at 405.
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Even if the "plain meaning" canon of construction was embodied in the
1780s common law tradition in interpreting a document, finding any such
meaning would prove no easy task. That proposition is demonstrated by
two early classic cases, Marbury v. Madison297 and McCulloch v. Mary-
land.298 Chief Justice Marshall, himself a delegate to the Virginia ratifying
convention, took the following positions, among others, in Marbury: (1) The
Court lacked original jurisdiction because the express mandate of Article III
excluded it, absent a party's being a state or a foreign ambassador 299 and (2)
Article III, given its language and logic, created mutually exclusive catego-
ries of original and appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.3°° Mar-
shall's predecessor as Chief Justice, Oliver Ellsworth-delegate at
Philadelphia and primary draftsman of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789-
disagreed with Marshall's first position. 30 1 And even Marshall, in Cohens v.
Virginia,302 clarified that earlier position in Marbury. He explained that the
Court in Cohens had appellate jurisdiction, notwithstanding that a state was
a party. In Cohens, unlike in Marbury, jurisdiction existed because there
was a federal question; the nature of the parties was irrelevant.30 3 Moreover,
the Court later disagreed with Marshall's second position that such jurisdic-
tion was "mutually exclusive. ' '3°4
In construing the constitution of the United States, ... consider... its nature and objects,
its scope and design as apparent from the structure of the instrument... [w]here its words
are plain, clear and determinate, they require no interpretation, and [external evidence]
should, therefore, be admitted, if at all, with great caution, and only from necessity, either
to escape some absurd consequence, or to guard against some fatal evil.
Id.
297. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
298. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
299. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-74. Article III of the Constitution states:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which
a State shall be a party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all other
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
300. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the consti-
tution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the
constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the
constitution, is form without substance.
5 U.S. at 174.
301. F. McDONALD, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 39 (1982). As to
how Ellsworth interpreted the provision differently, McDonald states:
The paragraph [art. III, § 2, cl. 2] can be read in two different ways. One way is this: 'In
all the other cases,' the Supreme Court will have jurisdiction, on appeal from a lower court,
unless the Congress deprives it of jurisdiction. The other way is this: The Supreme Court
will have jurisdiction in both kinds of cases, and its jurisdiction in the second kind will be
appellate unless Congress makes it original. Ellsworth's bill took the latter position and
gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in certain cases in which jurisdiction would
otherwise have been appellate.
Id. (emphasis added). Presumably, had Ellsworth stayed on, he would have voted that the Court
had original jurisdiction in Marbury. "In sum, the constitution of the judiciary was for practical
purposes [to be] left to the Congress." Id. at 30.
302. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
303. Marshall rejected his earlier, unduly broad statement in Marbury, respecting jurisdiction.
Id. at 383-401.
304. Bors v. Preston, Ill U.S. 252 (1884). See 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982) (listing categories of
exclusive and non-exclusive original jurisdiction). Marbury, however, still stands for the proposition
that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction cannot be expanded.
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The inherent difficulty with finding "plain meaning" is exemplified best
by disagreements voiced in 1791305 over the constitutionality of the National
Bank, ultimately producing the McCulloch30 6 litigation. In part, dispute
centered upon how to interpret the "necessary and proper" 30 7 clause. To
Jefferson, the key to unlocking the meaning of that clause lay in focusing
upon another provision, the tenth amendment.30 8 He argued that incorpo-
rating a National Bank was beyond the powers of Congress because the
Bank was not necessary to carry out the national government's enumerated
powers.309 An overbroad construction endangered local government and
liberty.
Jefferson's arch-rival, Hamilton, disagreed. The Constitution gave a
wide latitude to Congress, as reflected in the "necessary and proper" clause.
Moreover, it was imperative that the great powers of the new national gov-
ernment be exercised effectively. 310 As for the definition of "necessary," too
rigid a construction, he said, would "beget endless uncertainty and
embarrassment. 311
Interpreting a Permanent Charter
The essential difficulty in interpreting the necessary and proper clause,
or countless other provisions, was that even though the 1787 document
might be a positive legislative enactment, it was still something almost brand
new: a written constitution, and one enforceable by courts as "law. '312
Whatever the common law heritage, those facts could not be ignored. More
was at stake here. Change by formal amendment would be different in kind
and much slower than traditional changes in ordinary legislation. As a re-
sult, the Court had to interpret Congress's powers flexibly to assure that the
document would remain viable. 313
305. President Washington asked his principal subordinates whether they viewed the contem-
plated national bank as within Congressional authority. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 83.
306. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
307. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
308. "I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on [the tenth amendment].... [T]o
take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to
take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition." G. GUNTHER,
supra note 4, at 84.
Jefferson was absent from the country, as ambassador to France, during the 1787 Convention.
But he was the respected drafter of the Declaration of Independence, and in 1791, Washington's
Secretary of State.
309. "[Enumerated powers] can all be carried into execution without a bank. A bank therefore
is not necessary, and consequently not authorized by this phrase.... [N]ecessary [means are to be
defined properly] as 'those... without which the grant of power would be nugatory.'" Id.
310. "[A] sound maxim of construction... [is that] powers contained in a constitution of gov-
ernment, [especially those which concern the general administration of the affairs of a country, its
finances, trade, defense, etc.] [ought] to be construed liberally in advancement of the public good."
Id. at 86.
311. "Necessary" meant "no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to,"
"when construed in its "obvious and popular sense." Id. at 85.
312. The Articles helped lead the way. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
313. [W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding ....
... a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to
the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which government
should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the
character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code.
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The Constitution and Our Political Traditions
The perceptive English observer, Walter Bagehot, was fascinated by
America's exercise in constitutional interpretation. This nineteenth century
student of government took note of the complex and burdensome amending
process. 314 The way courts got around that difficulty, he found both amus-
ing and wondrous; for Americans had to use "the most absurd fictions.., to
evade the plain sense of the mischievous clauses." 315 Bagehot gave as an
instance of strained constitutional construction: reading the President's "war
powers" 316 as authorizing him to issue paper money.317 While there was a
risk in establishing such a precedent, Bagehot believed that protection lay in
the moderate American tradition.318 Americans, he noted, extol their insti-
tutions. They ought to praise themselves for their political sense in maneu-
vering through the complexities of constitutional obstacles. 319
Constitutional Interpretation: The Levels of Generality
Moderate political tradition as a safeguard or not, American judges
who engaged in the process of constitutional decision-making had to realize
the loose fabric they were fitting. Canons of statutory construction would
offer only limited guidance when the writing was an enduring Constitution.
Included within the interpretive menu was a choice among several levels of
generality.
In fathoming a clause's meaning or a maker's intent, what question
should be put? Take, for example, Article II's provision that the President is
to be "Commander-in-Chief." One can ask about the general concept, con-
sidering it akin to a living organism, remaining vital whether in the age of
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407-15 (1819) (emphasis in original).
314. W. BAGEHOT, supra note 3, at 225.
315. The consequence is that the most obvious evils cannot be quickly remedied, that the
most absurd fictions must be framed to evade the plain sense of the mischievous clauses;
that a clumsy working and curious technicality mark the politics of a rough.and.ready
people. The practical arguments and the legal disquisitions in America are often like those
of trustees carrying out a misdrawn will-the sense of what they mean is good, but it can
never be worked out fully or defended simply, so hampered is it by the old words of an old
testament.
Id.
316. U.S. CONsr. art. 2, § 1, cl. 1; id. at § 2, cls. 1, 2; Id. at § 3, cl. 3.
317. It sounds a joke, but it is true nevertheless, that this power to issue greenbacks is
decided to belong to the President as commander-in-chief of the army; it is part of what
was called the 'war powers.' In truth, money was wanted in the late war, and the adminis-
tration got it in the readiest way; and the nation glad not to be more taxed, wholly ap-
proved of it.
W. BAGEHOT, supra note 3, at 224.
318. But the fact remains that the President has now, by precedent and decision, a mighty
power to continue a war without the consent of the Congress, and perhaps against its wish.
Against the united will of the American people a President would of course be impotent;
such is the genius of the place and nation that he could never think of it.
Id.
319. But if they had not a genius for politics; if they had not a moderation in action singu-
larly curious where superficial speech is so violent; if they had not a regard for law, such as
no great people have yet evinced, and infinitely surpassing ours-the multiplicity of au-
thorities in the American Constitution would long ago have brought it to a bad end. Sensi.
ble shareholders, I have heard a shrewd attorney say, can work any deed of settlement; and
so the men of Massachusetts could, I believe, work any constitution.
Id. at 228.
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the Yankee peddler or in the nuclear age. Much more narrowly, one can
inquire as to the specific evil of the time, and the response-the "concep-
tion" intended by the drafters in that 1787 setting.320
The Legal Culture: Who Were The Makers?
Interpretive choice, in the legal environment of the period, is compli-
cated by another basic problem: Who were the makers of this new docu-
ment, those to whom one should look for instruction, or at least for
guidance? The answer is important because it sheds light upon the nature of
the union created and upon the role of the states. Were the "sovereign
states" the makers, and thus powerful independent actors? Or were the
"American people" the drafters, with the states being mere convenient polit-
ical instruments for the people's will?321 The Articles, in terms at least, con-
320. The controversy centers on the level of generality on which an interpreter should try to
apprehend the adopters' intentions. On the highest or broadest level, an interpreter poses
the questions: "What was the general problem to which this provision was responsive and
how did the provision respond to it?" On the most specific level, she inquires: "How
would the adopters have resolved the particular issue that we are now considering?"
Brest, Constitutional Interpretation, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTrrUTION, supra
note 6, at 465-66.
321. In considering who the makers of the Constitution were, we must deal with a number of
preliminary, interrelated questions: Did the Congress create the states, or the reverse? Were we
"one" people or several peoples? What did the Framers mean by "We the People," the phrase in the
Constitution's preamble? And finally, did the political leaders or other actors of the time take much
interest in these questions?
Levy takes the position that Congress created the states. "Congress, representing the United
States, authorized the creation of the states," yet he notes the complexity of the matter, by adding
that Congress "ended up, as it had begun, as their creature," for Congress had no means for enforc-
ing the powers delegated to it by the Articles. Levy, supra note 95, at 379.
Lincoln accepted the view that the "Union is older than the States, and in fact created them as
States." Levy, supra note 95, at 376-77. See also R. MORRIS, supra note 76, at 55: "A .ational
government was in operation before the formation of the states." "It was Congress which issued the
call to the people of the colonies to organize state governments .... The historic date which should
settle this issue [whether sovereignty originated in the Congress or the states] is May 10, 1776 [when
Congress passed a resolution] urging the provinces to organize state governments." Id. at 58. Even
Burke, the author of the amendment to specify that sovereignty remained in the states, took the
position, three years before the Articles were ratified, that state laws in conflict with Congressional
resolves were void. Id. at 90. Chief Justice Marshall declared that "the colonies were confederated
from the beginning and that federal power, within its assigned sphere, was supreme from the start of
the Second Congress in 1775." Id. Those who say that sovereignty originated in the states rely on
the Articles, but "the Articles did not go into effect until March 1, 1781." Id. at 55.
The Declaration of Independence of 1776 hedged on the question whether one people or several
peoples were declaring their independence. In its preamble, the document spoke of "one people" but
in its final affirmation it used a plural "these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and
Independent States." Morgan, supra note 158, at 374. Moreover, the members of the Continental
Congress "did not consider their Declaration... complete until it had been ratified by each of the
separate states whose freedom and independence it declared." Id. at 375. On the other hand, "in
stating what constituted free and independent statehood, the Declaration specified only 'power to
levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce.' These were all things, with the
possible exception of the last, that had been done or would be done by the Congress." Id. at 374-75.
What explains the use of the expression, "We the People of the United States" in the Constitu-
tion's preamble? Charles Warren explained that the choice of wording was a less philosophical
premise of a national Union than strategic ambiguity. The expression was used because the Framers
could not know which nine states would ratify. C. WARREN, supra note 188, at 395. Patrick Henry
immediately demanded to know "by what right" the expression had been employed. Morgan, supra,
at 367. In effect, in using the wording, "the Philadelphia delegates ... invented the American people
... distinct from and superior to the peoples of the states." Id. at 376. Yet as far back as 1774, use
of the expression "People of the United States" was employed in the Continental Congress. M.
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stituted a "compact," 322 expressly among sovereign states;32 3 an amendment
required every state's endorsement for passage. 324
But did the drafters in 1787 intend the new constitution to be viewed as
a mere agreement among the states? The language in the new document 325
seems to militate against the conclusion that the Constitution was also a
compact. The new, invigorated enforcement machinery 326 seems to rule out
the "compact" approach as well. Yet the nature of the union created in the
1780s was not finally resolved until the Civil War.
The Legal Culture of the 1780s: Legislative History
Beyond the effort to identify the Constitution's makers is a related ques-
tion. Is it appropriate to look at external evidence, legislative history, to
fathom their intent? Indeed, in the legal culture of the time, was a statute's
legislative history considered at all in determining its meaning? Powell
maintains that the practice was "almost wholly nonexistent. ' 327 That may
be so, but was the practice deemed improper328 or simply a function of the
unavailability of records of legislative debates, 329 as Raoul Berger maintains?
There is no assurance as to the answers. But what is clear is that, given
JENSEN, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 26, at 165. Consolidationists used the radical
notion of sovereignty of the American people as an engine of nationalism. Id. at 244.
The problem of the locus of sovereignty in the 1770s and 1780s seems unresolvable. "The
Declaration of Independence, the state constitutions, and the Articles of Confederation all failed to
clarify the controversial issue of ultimate sovereignty .... The states, in their own constitutions,
"were no more able to solve individually the question of exact distribution of power between them
and the Congress than their delegations could collectively." W. ADAMS, supra note 92, at 288.
Yet perhaps the place of sovereignty was not all that important to the actors of that period.
"Nothing in the general reception that the articles received suggests that Americans were deeply
interested in discussing the nature of the union they were forming." J. RAKOVE, supra note 29, at
185. On the other hand, "most probably rejected (James) Wilson's view of the inherent sweep of
congressional authority without giving up an intuitive belief that in certain critical cases Congress
must reign supreme .... [Tihe idea that the confederation was essentially only a league of sovereign
states was ultimately a fiction. Congress was in fact a national government." Id. at 184.
322. Powell, supra note 284, at 904.
323. Articles of Confederation art. II.
324. Id. at art. XIII.
325. The Constitution is "the Supreme Law of the Land," U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; oaths are
taken by individual state officials, id.; and there is no unanimity requirement for passage of an
amendment. U.S. CONST. art. V.
326. The executive branch, U.S. CONST. art II; and the new independent federal judiciary, with
broad jurisdiction, U.S. CoNsT. art III.
327. PoweU, supra note 284, at 897.
328. The "late eighteenth century common lawyer conceived an instrument's 'intent'-and
therefore its meaning-not as what the drafters meant by their words but rather as what judges,
employing the 'artificial reason and judgment of law,' understood 'the reasonable and legal meaning'
of those words to be." Id. at 896. "The framers shared the traditional common law view-so for-
eign to much hermeneutical thought in more recent years-that the import of the document they
were framing would be determined by reference to the intrinsic meaning of its words or through the
usual judicial process of case by case interpretation." Id. at 903-04.
329. Powell triumphantly asserts that "It]he modern practice of interpreting a law by refer-
ence to its legislative history was almost wholly non-existent." The reason is simple: there
was no legislative history. In England, Thomas Hansard, 'began in 1803 to print the Par-
liamentary Debates' .... The journal of our own Constitution was not published until
1819; Madison's notes of the Convention first appeared in 1840; and the debates in the
state ratification conventions were collected in 1827 .... [It] passes understanding why
Powell resists inclusion of recorded intent, i.e. legislative history, as evidence of
"intention."
Berger, "Original Intention", supra note 291, at 307.
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a revered fundamental instrument, it is no surprise that legislative history
came to play an important role. Thus, by 1791, Jefferson argued in the Na-
tional Bank debate that the Constitutional Convention's rejection of a grant
of power to Congress to establish corporations was significant. 330 On the
other hand, Hamilton rejected an inquiry into legislative background, at
least there, where he believed the language of the Constitution was clear.33'
How significant would legislative history be, even if it were considered?
And whose account would be authoritative? In part, it depended upon who
the "makers" were, and upon the availability of evidence. The journals of
the Constitutional Convention were not available until 1819332 and
Madison's notes, the most complete and accurate of the diaries, not until
1840.333 Moreover, not all the debates in the ratifying conventions were re-
corded. 334 In any event, Story cautioned that the "private interpretations of
any particular man, or body of men, must manifestly be open to much obser-
vation. ' 335 He added that there was no certainty of "the same uniform in-
terpretation" 336 in the ratifying conventions. Yet, for Madison, "the voice of
the people [spoke] through the several State Conventions. ' 337 As for the
statements and records at the Constitutional Convention, he would later
minimize their importance. 338
The Role of Precedent
If legislative history was not determinative, could subsequent govern-
ment action, in the absence of such a record, resolve the matter of a provi-
sion's meaning? Madison thought so. 339  He eventually "waived" his
330. [IThe very power now proposed as a means was rejected as an end by the Convention.
[A] proposition was made to them to authorize Congress to open canals, and an amenda-
tory one to empower them to incorporate. But the whole was rejected, and one of the
reasons for rejection urged in debate was, that then they would have a power to erect a
bank, which would render the great cities, where there were prejudices and jealousies on
the subject, adverse to the reception of the Constitution.
G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 84 (quoting Jefferson).
331. [Whatever may have been the nature of the proposition or the reasons for rejecting it,
it includes nothing in respect to the real merits of the question. [I]f a power to erect a
corporation in any case be deducible, by fair inference, from the whole or any part of the
numerous provisions of the Constitution of the United States, arguments drawn from ex-
trinsic circumstances, regarding the intention of the Convention, must be rejected.
Id. at 86 (quoting Hamilton).
332. Berger, "Original Intention", supra note 291, at 307.
333. Id.
334. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 123 n.25 (1969).
335. Story, supra note 286, at 388, 406.
336. Id.
337. Powell, supra note 284, at 938 (quoting Madison).
338. "As a guide in expounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, debates and
incidental decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative character." Id. at 936. "As the
instrument came from [the drafters], it was nothing more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead
letter, until life and validity were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the
several State Conventions." Id. at 938.
339. It could not but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that...
differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms and phrases necessarily
used in such a charter.., and that it might require a regular course of practice to liquidate
and settle the meaning of some of them.
Id. at 941 (quoting Madison).
1989]
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objection to the federal establishment of a National Bank on that basis.340
Nonetheless, meaning was fixed in the document. In 1831, Madison ex-
pressed the view that precedent "can expound but not alter the
Constitution.134 1
An Unfinished Constitution
What of case precedent? A focus on precedent, especially judicial deci-
sions, emphasized a case-by-case, evolutionary process. That meant that as-
certaining meaning could take time. Indeed so, for not only was there
disagreement about what had been done at the Convention, but just as im-
portant, there were gaps in the document itself. The Constitution created in
1787 was unfinished.342 In part, it was incomplete because it was subject to
change through formal amendment. 343 But that was far from the only rea-
son. There was also uncertainty as to the flesh on the bones of the new
constitutional creation. Even more important, there was uncertainty as to
the nature of the skeleton itself.344 What was the nature of the Union cre-
ated? How would the national financial system be set up? Would political
parties be a legitimate system of channeling political power? What was the
scope of presidential removal power?
Indeed, "almost every significant issue considered by the Congress re-
quired ... constitutional construction. '345 The first Congress enacted so
much fundamental law, that it is likened to "the second constitutional con-
vention. ' 346 The 1789 Congress fulfilled the pledge to propose a bill of
rights and it established a federal court system. It also created a funding
system in which the public debt was to serve as the basis of the national
monetary system. In that regard, Congress took steps to make the Secretary
340. Further challenge to the Bank's constitutionality was "precluded in my judgment by re-
peated recognition under varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution in acts of the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government." G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 89
(quoting Madison).
341. R. BERGER, "Original Intention", supra note 291, at 330, 335 (quoting Madison (1831)).
Madison preferred fixed meaning to unbounded judicial construction. Id. at 326 ("as understood by
the nation at the time of its ratification").
342. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 24, at 134-35 (as to the scope of the division of
power between the nation and the states). "[I]t is clear that the Convention did not make a decision
dispositive of the locus of sovereignty in the new union." Id. at 143. "Were the states still sover-
eign?" "Who had the ultimate power to interpret the nature of the Constitution, and to decide
disputes between state and national authority?" Id. at 144.
[The Constitution] had blanks and ambiguities that needed to be worked out by compro-
mise, experience, and precedent... [I]t left open two crucial questions: who determines
when government is acting unconstitutionally, and what is the remedy? ... [I]t failed to
anticipate... the emergence of political parties... [I]t was not until 1807 (and after 12
amendments) that the constitutional system had firmly jelled.
F. McDONALD, supra note 301, at 35; R. MORRIS, supra note 76, at 322.
343. "The virtue of the Federal Constitution seemed its flexibility rather than any novel principle
of federalism or republicanism. Its real immortality would consist in its capacity by amendment, to
'keep pace with the advance of the age in science and experience.'" D. BOORSTIN, supra note 145, at
212.
344. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 24, at 134-35.
345. Powell, supra note 284, at 913 (from the matter of a cabinet system, to the protective tariff,
to the national bank, to the slave trade, to public debt policy).
346. F. McDONALD, supra note 301, at 36 (e.g., the Bill of Rights, the funding of the debt under
the Hamiltonian system, and the Judiciary Act of 1789).
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of Treasury responsible, not only to the President, but to itself as well. 347
Madison's actions as Congressman in the first Congress and thereafter,
reflected his own interpretations of some of the Constitution's uncertainties.
For example, the Constitution did not state if the Senate's approval was re-
quired when the President wanted to remove a subordinate.348 Madison
urged Presidential prerogative here so that a President could control his de-
partment.349 Hamilton, in The Federalist, took a contrary view: Senate in-
volvement was mandatory because there was an obvious design of symmetry
in the appointment and removal powers here.350
Although the Framers (Madison included) apparently considered par-
ties contrary to republican principles, Madison's position would appear to
shift over time. His premise in the 1780s seemed to be that political factions
were evils;35 1 while it was counterproductive to try to eliminate them,352
they should be sharply confined. He appeared to revise that assessment in
the face of the development of the Federalist Party. He once hoped that a
large republic could limit any one faction's power, but by 1800, he came to
the view that parties were a legitimate channel of politics. Indeed, he be-
came Jefferson's lieutenant in creating the Democratic Republican Party.353
Madison's views also shifted as to the dangers threatened by Congres-
sional powers. He was a nationalist 354 at the Convention, but by 1798, in the
face of the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, he seemed to move to-
ward a compact model of the Constitution. He and Jefferson came to urge
"interposition" 355 by the states, in an effort to stop national government en-
forcement of the statute. But it remains unclear what Madison meant by
"interposition" in his Virginia Resolutions, beyond the effort to instruct
members of Congress to seek repeal.356
The Legal Culture of the 1780s: The Phenomenon of Judicial Review
The Constitution of 1787 continued to evolve. Indeed, it did not "jell"
until about 1807. 357 Even further complicating present day constitutional
interpretation is the ultimate dilemma: was the Constitution unfinished in
the invention of judicial review itself? And was the process of examination
347. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 24, at 161.
348. U.S. CONST. art II.
349. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 24, at 160.
350. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 515 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
351. H. HENDERSON, supra note 162, at 432 (growth of parties was contrary to republican
precepts). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56, 57 (3. Madison) (I. Cooke ed. 1961). "[Plarties
... were not recognized in the Constitution. None of the Founding Fathers had professed affection
for them, but in the long run it was the party system that seemed to make the Constitution more
workable and more responsive to the American people." R. MORRIS, supra note 198, at 261.
352. Rudimentary legislative political parties were present in the Continental Congress and were
the prelude to our first national party system. See generally H. HENDERSON, supra note 162.
353. F. McDONALD, supra note 301, at 35, 45 (The delegates failed to contemplate political
parties and expected the Constitution to make parties impossible.).
354. Powell, supra note 284, at 948 n.331. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 24, at 108
(The Virginia Plan was "probably mostly his work" and was an "exceedingly nationalistic solu-
tion.") I. BRANT, supra note 243, at 114.
355. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 24, at 198; R. BERGER, "Original Intention", supra
note 291, at 332; G. GUNTHER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW, supra note 305, at 39.
356. G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 39.
357. F. McDonald, supra note 301, at 35.
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and review of the new constitution to take place in the course of ordinary
lawsuits? Furthermore, even if judicial review was intended or was properly
deducible from the language of the Constitution, what was to be its nature
and scope?
As to the matter of founder intent, debate still persists. On one side
stand scholars Corwin, Levy, and Gunther:
People who say the Framers intended [judicial review] are talking non-
sense.., people who say they did not intend it are talking nonsense. 3 8
On the other side are Warren, Farrand, and Hart and Wechsler, among
others:
[T]he Convention's understanding [that the Framers intended it]
emerges from its records with singular clarity. 35 9
Bickel appeared to agree with the latter group, while conceding that such
intent cannot be "ascertained with finality."36° To some students of history,
judicial review was hardly entrenched until the 1800s. 36 1 Yet to the most
revered jurist in American history, John Marshall, the power had always
inhered in the Constitution. 362
We cannot resolve the issue whether the phenomenon was intended. At
best, we are left with a case for and one against. What is the evidence in
support? It includes the following: Lord Coke's admonition that a parlia-
mentary measure at odds with "common right and reason" could be ad-
judged void;363 the Framers' belief that the revered Coke spoke "the law;''364
Otis' invoking of natural law principles in Paxton's Case in 1761;365 the oc-
casions, however rare, when the Privy Council nullified colonial legisla-
tion;366 the several instances in which state court judges struck down state
legislation in the 1780s, while purporting to rest, at least in part, upon state
constitutional provisions; 367 the several remarks by important Framers, 3 68 in
the course of the Convention's rejection of a Council of Revision in which
358. G. GUNTHER, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 83, at 1056 (quoting Conwin).
359. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 14 (1953)
(citing and endorsing the conclusions of Charles Warren, Charles Beard, and Max Farrand).
360.
[I]t is as clear as such matters can be that the Framers of the Constitution specifically, if
tacitly, expected that the federal courts would assume a power--of whatever exact dimen-
sions-to pass on the constitutionality of actions of the Congress and the President, as well
as of the several States. Moreover, not even a colorable showing of decisive historical
evidence to the contrary can be made. Nor can it be maintained that the language of the
Constitution is compelling the other way.
At worst it may be said that the intentions of the Framers cannot be ascertained with
finality; that there were some who thought this and some that, it will never be entirely clear
just exactly where the collective judgment-which alone is decisive--came to rest.
A. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH-SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 15-16
(1961).
361. See G. GUNTHER, JUDICIAL REvIEW, supra note 83, at 1056; F. McDONALD, supra note
301, at 35.
362. Marbury, 5 U.S. 137.
363. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
364. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 291, at 24, 27.
365. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
366. G. GUNTHER, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 83, at 1056.
367. Corwin, supra note 246, at 10 (discussing Holmes v. Walton (1780)); at 11 (discussing
Trevett v. Weeden (1786)); at 15 (discussing Bayard v. Singleton (1787)); at 17 (discussing Rutgers v.
Waddington (1784)); see also A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 24, at 93-94.
368. G. GUNTHER, JUDICIAL REvIEW, supra note 83, at 1056.
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the Supreme Court would have played a veto role; statements by several
leaders in some of the state conventions; 3 69 Hamilton's argument in The
Federalist Number 78;370 Article III's broad statement of federal court juris-
diction; 37 1 Article VI's supremacy clause,372 with its oath commitments of
state and federal officials; the action of the first Congress through the 1789
Judiciary Act, purporting to establish jurisdiction in the Court over state
court judgments resting on federal questions; 373 the precedent of the Articles
as a "species of law," enforceable by the courts;374 and finally, the overall
structure and format of the document itself.375
The case against an intent to establish judicial review minimizes those
elements: Coke's dicta represented a position never actually taken by the
English courts;376 the state court precedents in the 1780s were scattered,
usually not representing a clear holding grounded upon constitutional objec-
tion, and generally not supported as legitimate by the legislatures in ques-
tion;377 there was surprisingly little discussion about judicial review at the
convention;378 accordingly, there should be caution about attributing to that
body any position on the matter; debates at several of the state conventions,
being unrecorded, are unclear at best;379 Article III left unstated any such
important role for the courts;3 80 the supremacy clause381 need not be inter-
preted -as providing a power of judicial review in the Supreme Court, espe-
cially vis-a-vis the Congress.
Madison, the father of the Constitution, seemed to be of two minds in
reflecting upon the scope of judicial power. On the one hand, he cautioned
against a view that the courts were paramount in interpreting the Constitu-
tion.38 2 On the other hand, he believed that the federal courts would be a
369. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 291, at 123.
370. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 521, 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (The Supreme
Court will exercise "neither Force nor Will, but merely Judgment.").
371. U.S. CONT. art. III, § 1.
372. U.S. CONT. art. VI, § 2.
373. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (addressing the Judiciary Act
of 1789, § 25).
374. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
375. C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 6-7
(1960) (reading "like law... [the Constitution] neither argues nor exhorts").
376. G. GUNTHER, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 83, at 1056. Judicial review had been
"around for a long time ... had been discredited in eighteenth century England and before the
1790's won little acceptance in America .... And yet it was taken for granted by many lawyers that
the Supreme Court would have the power of judicial review under the Constitution." F. McDoN-
ALD, supra note 301, at 48.
377. G. GUNTHER, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 83, at 1056 (state court precedents "hardly
established a well-entrenched practice"); see also F. MCDONALD, supra note 301, at 48; Corwin,
supra note 246, at 18; A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 24, at 93 (practice was "shadowy and
uncertain").
378. "Probably nothing in the whole debates is more astonishing than the slight discussion re-
ported by Madison as given to the Judiciary Article in the Report of the Committee of Detail of
August 6. It is probable.., that Madison considerably condensed his Notes at this point, owing to
the technicalities of the subject." C. WARREN, supra note 188, at 531. See also G. GUNTHER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 83, at 1056.
379. Berger, "Original Intentions", supra note 291, at 321 (apparently there are extant, records
of less than half the ratifying conventions).
380. U.S. CONST. art. III.
381. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
382. I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 1787-1800, at 127, 260
(1950).
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bulwark against unlimited government. 383
Whether intended or not, judicial review has been the practice since
1803.384 But the dispute is important, even today. Thus, a scholar like Her-
bert Wechsler, certain that judicial review was intended, asserts a duty by
the justices to confront constitutional issues, although he urges the courts to
follow "neutral principles" 385 transcending the particular dispute. Learned
Hand believed that judicial review was more a matter of necessity than of
logical deduction from Framer intent or the language of the text. Thus, he
cautioned that the courts should exercise self-restraint. 386
The Mix
Yet, as we have seen, the lack of clarity regarding the judicial role was
simply one element-albeit an important one-in the richly complex brew of
the Confederate legal culture in which the Framers drafted the Constitution.
Among the other ingredients were a republican ideology, notions of a higher
law and ancient English rights, a century of being the people of the Charter,
and the common law with all its instruction and mystery. Stirring that soup
was a confidence that'the Framers could change the world, and, at the same
time, a cautious skepticism about human nature. Pragmatism overcame
Framer concerns that they might be violating the technicalities of the lan-
guage of their mandates, just as it impelled them earlier to read loosely colo-
nial charters purporting to confine colonial liberties. Political realities also
served to restrain their most doctrinaire enthusiasms. Thus, while principle
might dominate in the legal culture, history, including precedent, and practi-
calities would mediate.
The Constitution's Message
Given such a culture, did the document of 1787, together with its Bill of
Rights, transmit any mandated, identifiable message? Did the king wear any
clothes? Doubtless, he was outfitted in a fine garment. And many parts of
the weave were clearly visible. Perhaps the best example is the description of
the composition and powers of Congress.387 Yet several other parts could be
seen only faintly, in broad outline, and these were fundamental to any under-
standing. They included principles bearing upon the function of the
[There is] no provision... for the case of a disagreement in expounding [the state constitu-
tion or the federal constitution] as the courts are generally the last in making the decision,
it results to them by refusing or not refusing to execute a law, to stamp it with its final
character. This makes the Judiciary Department paramount in fact to the legislature,
which was never intended and can never be proper.
I do not see that any one of these independent departments has more right than an-
other to declare their sentiments [as to the boundaries of the departments] ....
383. Id. at 267.
384. Marbury, 5 U.S. 137.
385. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959)
(Judicial review is "grounded in the language of the Constitution and [it] is not mere interpola-
tion."). Id. at 3 (The courts should employ "neutral principles."). Id. at 6 (Moreover, there is a
judicial duty of the Supreme Court to decide constitutional issues properly before the tribunal.). Id.
at 6.
386. Since judicial review is "not a logical deduction ... but only a practical condition, it need
not [always] be exercised." L. HAND, BILL OF RIGHTS 14, 15 (1958).
387. U.S. CoNsT. art. I.
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Supreme Court as boundary keeper and guardian of human rights, the
dimensions of the President's responsibility as "stewart" during crises, and
the relationship between nation and state.
Indeed, focusing upon Supreme Court decisions in particular, an ob-
server is hard pressed to name any constitutional interpretations which have
definitely violated the Court's "mandate." Not that we would not consider
some past rulings abhorrent.388 Some were! However, others were wonder-
ful389 and many others at least reasonable. 390 But our assessments rest upon
how each of us identifies and balances included principles, infuses them with
our own moral values, and perceives practical necessity.
Today's Justices legitimately choose from a menu of starting points and
emphases. 391 They are free to draw upon their own value predispositions,
stressing ideas they consider preeminent in our constitutionalism. 392 More-
over, they can select any level of generality-narrow or broad-upon which
388. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). This decision protected
slavery, even in the territories. Yet the Court just as readily could have (1) invoked the broad
statement of Congressional power in Art. I; (2) emphasized history both predating and subsequent to
the enactment of the constitution, in which the Congress outlawed slavery in the Northwest Terri-
,tory; and (3) noted the lack of direction contained in the fifth amendment's right to "property." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8; amend. V; NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, art. VI.
389. See, eg., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court interpreted the four-
teenth amendment equal protection clause to proscribe state-enforced racial segregation in the public
schools. The Court emphasized the apparent Framer commitment to protect the former slaves, the
broad principle of racial equality, and the negative impact in modern times of such racial equality,
and the negative impact in modem times of such segregation upon educational opportunity. Id. at
490, 492. It called "inconclusive," and seemed to deemphasize, the significance of Framer views on
the narrow question of whether segregated schools came within the prohibition. Id. at 489. The
post-Civil War amendments, of course, worked another constitutional revolution, yet the basic ambi-
guities in Court role and power, stemming from the 1780s traditions, remained. This was so, given
the almost one hundred years of received amorphous legal tradition.
390. See, eg., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). In Blaisdell, the
Court upheld a temporary extension of the period within which a mortgagor could be protected from
foreclosure, notwithstanding the Constitution's proscription against a state's "impairment of the
obligation of contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. The Court found no impairment, only a change
in remedy. Obviously, however, it recognized the need to assure meaningful state police power
during the Depression, rather than to focus on framer concerns about state laws benefiting debtors.
In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (87 How.) 1 (1849), the Court, announcing the doctrine of "polit-
ical question," chose not to intervene in a dispute in which two groups each claimed to be the lawful
government of Rhode Island. In order for the United States to assure each state a "republican form
of government" under article IV, section 4, swift and unmistakable action by the national political
branches was needed. It was neither sensible nor workable for the slow-moving, deliberative Court
to get involved.
In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the Court upheld a status independent of the
President, for a special prosecutor, appointed under a rule made by the President's own Attorney
General. The Court then compelled the President to turn over evidence unrelated to his responsibili-
ties and bearing materially upon serious federal felonies. The Court recognized practicalities in legit-
imizing such a prosecutorial status. It asserted the moral principle that "no one is above the law."
However, it implied that the case's value as precedent is limited, given the fundamental place of an
independent Presidency with substantial authority to carry out the oath under Article 2 to protect
the nation's constitution. Id. at 706. "The President's need for complete candor and objectivity
from advisers calls for great deference." Id. In Nixon, there was an absence of "a claim of need to
protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets." Id.
391. Landever, Perceptions of Judicial Responsibility-the Views of the Nine United States
Supreme Court Justices as They Consider Claims in Fourteenth Amendment Non-criminal Cases: A
Post-Bakke Evaluation, 14 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 1097 (1978).
392. These include commitment to federalism as they understand it, policy-making by the elec-
tive branches, special guardianship for insular political minorities, etc. The Justices exercise their
authority, based upon their own conceptions of its scope as members interface with other institu-
tions. Judicial attitudes toward presumptions of constitutionality, burdens of proof, the significance
"1989]
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the words of the text are to be understood.393
Self-Imposed Limits
In view of such wide discretion inherited by the present members of the
Supreme Court, are there any limits they can place upon themselves as they
come to their task?394 Three restraints come to mind. (1) Candor. The
Justices ought to be frank in stating their own perceptions of judicial role,
and in explaining their reasons for their choices among arguably relevant
principles and precedents. (2) A respect for history. The Justices should
probably presume in favor of precedent in order to safeguard against their
own biases. History, however, including prior case law, ought not to be
blindly confining. With its story of our constitutional march toward ex-
panding freedom and equality, history should instead serve to illumine the
way. Of course, it cannot provide ready-made answers to today's constitu-
tional dilemmas; only superficial or simplistic history presumes to furnish
such solutions. (3) A willingness to listen and to be persuaded. The Justices
ought not to consider themselves as lawyers from nine separate law firms
who assemble merely to state their positions and vote.395 They should actu-
ally engage in dialogue and hard debate; and they should attempt, through
their opinions, to bring into the discussion of the constitutional enterprise
the democratically elected institutions.396
CONCLUSION
Complexities abound; yet the story of the Confederation period, and the
culture in which the delegates in Philadelphia found themselves, can provide
of silence by such institutions, access rules, new mechanisms for broad remedial relief will be affected
accordingly.
393. Brest, Constitutional Interpretation, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION, supra note 6, at 465-66; G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 4,
at 34-35 (1986).
394. Obviously, there are significant external limits to Court authority, including, among others,
constitutional amendment, appointment power, presidential enforcement power, Congressional
funding power, willingness of individuals to be parties in litigation, attorney skills, institutional
resistance strategies, etc.; and the Court may invoke prudential rules of restraint. See Ashwander v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
395. See Ruing Fixed Opinions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1988, at A16, col. 5. Justice Scalia stated
that" '[n]ot very much conferencing goes on' at the conferences.... By 'conferencing' . .. he meant
efforts to persuade others to change their views by debating points of disagreement .... ' Scalia
added that 'to call our discussion of a case a conference is really something of a misnomer. It's much
more a statement of the views of each of the nine Justices, after which the totals are added and the
case is assigned ... ' " Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a recent book said that "as a newly appointed
Justice in 1972, he was 'surprised and disappointed at how little interplay there was between Justices'
at conferences." Id.
396. See, eg., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1973). Justice
Powell's majority opinion, while rejecting the constitutional claim, encouraged the state legislatures
to reexamine their tax systems. Id.
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is not to be viewed as placing its judicial
imprimatur on the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may
well have relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innova-
tive thinking as to public education, its methods, and its funding is necessary to assure both
a higher level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters merit the
continued attention of scholars . . . . But the ultimate solutions must come from the
lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them.
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a point of departure in undertaking the task of constitutional interpretation
today. At the least, the Articles and the government of the Confederation
period deserve better than oblivion. Nor is it a fair match to compare the
scrapped ten year-old Articles with our beloved 200 year-old Constitution,
credited with all the good things that have happened in America since that
fateful, hot summer.
It is time to restore the Articles to their rightful place, as a former
champion. Here we are in 1988. Floyd Patterson and Ingemar Johannson,
heavyweight boxers who fought in championship bouts twenty-five years ago
recently trained together in Los Angeles for a marathon run. A photograph
shows them jogging side by side. They are friends now; the turmoil of the
past is forgotten.3 97 It is equally time for a return to respectability for the
Articles. There should be an accommodation between our two great consti-
tutions. The Articles, we have seen, were a significant stage in world history
and in American constitutionalism, a crucible through which our constitu-
tional enterprise was transformed. They were the product of pragmatists,
guided, not blinded, by history. That history of which the Articles were a
part, challenges as it instructs. It tells us that there is much reason to cele-
brate the Articles.
Oh sing, if you will, deserved songs, in praise of our Constitution. And
of the men who framed that law. But I implore you to recall the Arti-
cles. Of these, stand also in awe. (A.R.L.)
397. Old enemies, oldfriends, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 30, 1986, at 10G.
1989]
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